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Choi, Yongho (Ph.D., Economics)
Demand and Determinants of FDI: A Knowledge-Capital Approach
Thesis directed by Professor Keith E. Maskus
This dissertation seeks to reinforce our understanding of an important role of demand-side
in determining foreign direct investment (FDI). To do so, it both theoretically and empirically
extends the standard Knowledge-Capital (KC) approach, which is now a widely-adopted compre-
hensive framework to analyze overseas investment decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs).
It provides theoretical foundation and empirical evidence on main topic of the dissertation that
per-capita income is closely related to location and production decisions of MNEs.
Chapter 2 develops a theoretical model to examine the roles of demand-driven factors and
provides testable predictions driven from numerical simulation results. Therefore, it plays a role
of producing theoretical explanation for a link between per-capita income and overseas investment
decisions of MNEs.
Chapter 3 tests the hypotheses from the chapter 2, particularly the Linder hypothesis for
FDI, for Korean multinationals experiences. It shows that empirical results from System GMM
estimation technique are consistent with the theoretical predictions driven from the chapter 2. It
is estimated that a 10% decrease in per-capita income divergences between Korea and an average
host country leads to a 8.6% rise in Korean overseas direct investment. There was no change in
the main results both across different specifications and for the U.S. FDI experiences.
The final chapter empirically examines the determinants for sectoral FDI and compares their
influences in the manufacturing and services sectors. It shows distinct features of each sector makes
a difference in relative importance of FDI determinants between the two sectors.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
It is well-known that about 70% of world foreign direct investment (FDI) has been directed
among developed countries. As the countries are likely to be high in per-capita income, they can
be characterized by large demands and therefore they have been a major destination of FDI. This
fact would suggest that demand-related reasons, particularly per-capita income, are important for
explaining FDI.
In literature on FDI determinants, previous studies have primarily focused on production-
side determinants of FDI, such as labor endowments, investment impediments, trade costs, and so
on. This dissertation, on the other hand, considers demand-side determinants of FDI, based on
the Knowledge-Capital (KC) approach, which is a comprehensive framework adopted widely for
analyzing overseas investment decisions of multinational enterprises. To be more specific, the main
purpose of the dissertation is to explore, both theoretically and empirically, the relevance between
per-capita income and FDI, which has surprisingly little been investigated in the FDI literature.
By doing so, the dissertation provides theoretical foundation and empirical evidence on a close
relation between per-capita income and overseas investment decisions of MNEs.
The second chapter theoretically explores how demand-driven characteristics, particularly
per-capita income, play an important role in direct investment decisions of horizontal multina-
tional firms. First, I incorporate non-homothetic preferences into the existing oligopoly model of
horizontal multinational enterprises (Markusen and Venables, 1998), reflecting consumption pat-
terns closer to reality. Then, the simulation results show that production activities of horizontal
2multinationals crucially depend on growth and similarity of two countries per-capita income level.
These predictions provide theoretical foundation for the subsequent two empirical chapters.
Recent theoretical studies, including the chapter 2 and Markusen (2013), introduce non-
homotheticity of demand structure into a traditional model with horizontal multinational firms
to address the importance of per-capita income for horizontal FDI. Based on their theoretical
foundations, the third chapter extends the previous empirical KC model by taking into account
demand-driven determinants of horizontal FDI including the Linder hypothesis. To do so, I focus
on outward FDI between Korea and a sample of 57 host countries over the period since the 1997-
98 Asian financial crisis (1999-2010). The central empirical findings from a dynamic panel data
approach (System GMM) clearly suggest that Korean multinationals are likely to invest more in
countries that are similar in the level of per-capita income, supporting for the Linder effect for FDI.
These main results are robust across different specifications of empirical model and for U.S. data.
This chapter contributes to the relevant literature by providing empirical evidence on the Linder
effect for FDI and by analyzing FDI experiences of Korea, which is less large in terms of total GDP
and per-capita GDP and less abundant in terms of skilled-labor endowments than the U.S.
In final chapter, I empirically compare the influences of FDI determinants considered in the
KC models including the Linder effect between manufacturing and services sectors. Using sectoral
data on Korean FDI, it is shown that FDI in each sector is driven by national characteristics the
KC approaches consider but their influences vary according to distinct features of each sector. The
findings include: (1) services FDI is likely to be more market-seeking than manufacturing FDI; (2)
services FDI does not tend to be influenced by trade impediments; and (3) while producer services,
which include finance, business, and transport industries, are expected to play a role of intermediate
goods in production process of manufacturing sector, I do not confirm a complementary relation-
ship between manufacturing and producer services FDI. Given an expansion of services sectors
importance and a shift of FDI flows towards services sector, a key contribution of this chapter is to
uncover the differences in relative importance of determinants between manufacturing and services
FDI.
Chapter 2
DEMAND AND HORIZONTAL MULTINATIONAL FIRM
2.1 Introduction
It is now widely accepted that the Knowledge-Capital (KC) theory of the multinational
enterprises (MNEs) and its underlying models (e.g. Markusen and Venables, 1998) fairly account
for the existence of multinational firms and their direct investment decisions. The literature has
primarily analyzed the relationships between MNEs’ activities and relevant conditions such as
market size, relative skilled labor endowments, trade costs, investment barriers, and distance. These
factors are mainly related to production-side characteristics. Differently speaking, a significant role
of demand-side characteristics has surprisingly little been emphasized in the literature.
The well-known Linder hypothesis can be applied for understanding foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) patterns (Fajgelbaum et al., 2011). Linder (1961) hypothesized that the volume of
trade between countries which have similarities in demand patterns reaches big figures. Until now,
uncountable research has soley concentrated on the Linder effect to understand international trade
patterns. Because each firm can have another strategic option to serve foreign markets as direct
investment instead of trade, the Linder effect would also matter in expaining FDI patterns.
The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretically how demand-driven factors, particularly
per-capita income, play an important role on direct investment decisions of multinationals at aggre-
gate level. In the framework, I first incorporate non-homothetic preferences, explicated in Markusen
(2013), into the existing oligopoly model of horizontal multinational enterprises (Markusen and Ven-
ables, 1998), reflecting consumption patterns closer to reality. The model indicates that aggregate
4demand for a homogeneous good of multinational firm industry varies with per-capita income and
neutral factor, and that the effect of a change in per-capita income on aggregate demand is greater
than that of a change in neutral factor.
I then try to obtain several implications relevant with the demand factors by counterfactual
experiments. The first simulation result from the model is that affiliate production by multina-
tional firms becomes more intense as world aggregate demand grows, no matter which cause the
growth comes from. It is consistent with earlier empirical evidence (e.g. Carr et al., 2001). More
importantly, affiliate production by horizontal multinational firms is expected to depend closely
on similar levels of per-capita income as well as relative factor endowments among countries. As
per-capita income takes charge of key forces as a demand-side determinant of FDI, the negative
impact of a divergence in per-capita income remains even though local economies have an equal
and constant total income level. This central result mirrors the existence of the Linder effect for
FDI.
Recently, a few research has documented the importance of the similarity in per-capita in-
come among local economies for horizontal multinationals. Markusen (2013) accounts for multiple
issues including the central prediction of this paper by introducing non-homotheticity into the
demand side of a traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. To deal with horizontal multinationals, he
links non-homotheticity in demands for goods to the monopolistic-competition model of Markusen
and Venables (2000). He accordingly provides an illustration that a difference in per-capita income,
holding total income equal and constant between two countries, deters multinationals from building
production facilities in foreign countries. This result in Markusen (2013) is the same as the central
prediction of this paper, but there is a distinction in the result that can be inferred between the
monopolistic-competition model he uses and the oligopoly model this paper uses.1 The oligopoly
model can demonstrate a positive impact of world demand growth on FDI, where demand growth
comes from either per-capita income improvement or neutral factor accumulation. In the frame-
1The monopolistic-competition model manipulates differentiated good for multinational industry and iceberg trade
costs, whereas the oligopoly model handles homogeneous good and trade costs added to marginal costs.
5work, a larger level of world demand leads to reduce markups and raise firm-scale. There is an
incentive for firm-type switching. On the other hand, the monopolistic-competition model cannot
document the impact because a larger demand makes no change in markups and firm-scale (i.e. a
larger demand results in more entry at fixed firm-scale).
Further, this paper, unlike Markusen (2013), includes some analyses on neutral factor. Both
effects of a growth and a difference in neutral factor are qualitatively identical to those in per-capita
income. However, the size of each effect is expected to be smaller in the cases of neutral factor.
Therefore, this result suggests, in any empirical study, that the negative effect of a divergence in
per-capita income can be shown after controlling for the characteristic of population size.
Fajgelbaum et al. (2011) must be another important research relevant with this paper in that
the two studies commonly focus on the Linder effect for FDI. They combine a product-quality issue
with direct investment decisions of horizontal multinationals. Numerous studies dealing with the
product-quality issue generally suggest that a higher per-capita income country is more likely to
comsume high average quality goods and specialize in their production. Accordingly, they conclude
that horizontal multinationals’ activities tend to be larger among countries which reach at a similar
level of development as there is a strong positive relationship between per-capita income and good’s
quality consumed. This product-quality issue clearly distinguishes this paper from their study, but
the central finding from the two studies are not largely different. In the setting of this paper
assuming homogeneous good, a higher per-capita income country comsumes more goods, whereas
consumers in a higher per-capita income country require higher quality varieties in their model.
This paper has a simpler setting and shows that the Linder effect matters at aggregate level even
though the product-quality issue is removed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a simple Cournot
oligopoly model of horizontal multinationals dealing with homogeneous goods where preferences
are non-homothetic. Section 2.3 conducts the so-called impact effects in order to grasp intuition
to results in a general equilibrium for demand-driven determinants of FDI. Section 2.4 describes
a numerical model of general equilibrium and shows simulation results. Section 2.5 concludes and
6discusses some details that can be considered in subsequent empirical studies.
2.2 Model
The model is a 2×3×2 traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. It has two countries, i and j. The
countries produce two different homogeneous goods, Y and X. They also have a non-rivaled and
non-excludable endowment good Z as given. Good Y is produced with constant returns to scale
by a competitive industry. It is used as numeraire. Good X is produced with increasing returns
by imperfectly competitive Cournot firms. There are two production factors, S (skilled labor) and
L (unskilled labor). S is mobile between industries but internationally immobile.
In this paper, as I solely focus on horizontal motivation among diverse motivations of FDI,
it is assumed that all costs of X require factors in the same ratio. Thus, the further assumption
is adopted: the X industry utilizes only skilled labor and unskilled labor is utilized only in the Y
industry. In this paper, good X has a higher income elasticity of demand than good Y , as I will
look at this shortly. A certain validity of this assumption is therefore added by Caron et al. (2012),
who find that for goods in 56 broad industries their income elasticity of demand is positively related
with skilled-labor intensity in producing them. In addition, when transporting Y between countries
no costs are generated, whereas firms exporting X to foreign market should pay transport costs,
specified as units of S per unit of X exported.
2.2.1 Demand
Preferences take a variant Stone-Geary utility form with Cobb-Douglas function. This de-
mand structure characterized by nonhomotheticity makes a difference, in both qualitative and
quantitative terms, between the effect of per capita income on aggregate demand and the effect of
population.
72.2.1.1 Individual Demand
All households have simple identical nonhomothetic preferences, also used in Markusen
(2013), as follows.
u = (x+ z)β · y1−β, with z > 0, (2.1)
where x is per-household X consumption, y is per-household Y consumption, and z is a non-
country-specific constant. z is assumed as a given endowment good, for example air, for which each
household cannot have dealings with others. Thus, it has its own characteristics that are non-rivaled
and non-excludable. The preferences of the equation (2.1) allow that households earning insufficient
income purchase only good Y , reflecting consumption situation closer to reality (Markusen, 2013).2
Let mh, pX , pY be household h’s income, X’s price, Y ’s price, respectively. Then, household
budget constraint is:
mh = pX · x+ pY · y. (2.2)
Maximization of (2.1) subject to (2.2) yields the Marshallian demand function:
xh = max
{
0,
β ·mh
pX
− (1− β)z
}
, (2.3)
yh = min
{
mh
pY
,
(1− β)(mh + pX · z)
pY
}
. (2.4)
If xh = β·m
h
pX
− (1− β)z > 0, then mh > (1−β)pX ·zβ . Hence, we have
xh > 0 if and only if mh >
(1− β)pX · z
β
≡ m0. (2.5)
Figure 2.1 illustrates the properties of the assumed non-homothetic preferences. The repre-
sentative consumer begins to buy X above the threshold income indicated by m0 defined in the
equation (2.5), while she consumes only good Y at low levels of income. This makes demand struc-
2Many literatures, e.g. Markusen (1986), generally use the form of u = xβ · (y − z)1−β with z > 0 as the Stone-
Geary utility function. In this general form, any household having income less than a certain level cannot purchase
only good Y .
8Notes: This figure is taken from Figure 1 of Markusen (2013).
Figure 2.1: An Engel Curve under Non-homothetic Preferences
ture more realistic, and further implies that aggregate demand depends on the income distribution.
Assume in this paper that the equation (2.5) holds with strict inequality for all households.
2.2.1.2 Aggregate Demand
Let H be the number of households. Then, Z = z ·H be the economy-wide endowment of z.
z is a parameter and Z is strictly proportional to the number of households H. Thus, we have the
following expression for aggregate demand Xc for good X.
Xc =
H∑
h=1
xh =
βM
pX
− (1− β)Z, where Z = zH and M =
H∑
h=1
mh. (2.6)
Again, if the equation (2.5) holds for all households, then aggregate demand for X is independent
of the income distribution.
In non-homothetic preferences, in order to look at fundamental factors which affect the
aggregate demand, I slightly modify the equation (2.6) as follows, with denoting per-capita income
as m.
Xc =
βM
pX
− (1− β)Z = β
pX
(m ·H)− (1− β)(zH), where M = m ·H. (2.7)
This modified expression for aggregate demand shows that the two variables, the number of house-
9holds H and per-capita income m, fundamentally determines the aggregate demand Xc.
2.2.1.3 Elasticities of Demand for good X
In this sub-section, I consider three elasticities of demand for good X. First, I compare
per-capita income elasticity of demand with neutral factor elasticity of demand. Second, I obtain
price elasticity of demand.
Suppose first that a productivity (and therefore per-capita income) increases, holding the
number of households H and therefore Z constant. Then, we have per-capita income elasticity of
demand with respect to good X as follows.
dXc
Xc
dm
m
∣∣∣∣∣
dH=0
=
m
Xc
dXc
dm
=
m
m−m0 > 1, where m
0 =
(1− β)pX · z
β
. (2.8)
On the other hand, suppose that neutral factor (population) accumulates, holding the per-
capita income m constant. Then, neutral factor elasticity of demand is
dXc
Xc
dH
H
∣∣∣∣∣
dm=0
= 1. (2.9)
Now, Marshallian price elasticity, denoted by ε and defined as positive, is:
ε ≡ −
dXc
Xc
dpX
pX
= −pX
Xc
dXc
dpX
=
m
m−m0 > 1, where m
0 =
(1− β)pX · z
β
. (2.10)
Therefore, the per-capita income elasticity of demand and the price elasticity of demand for X are
(locally) the same in this structure.
2.2.1.4 Implications of Non-homothetic Preferences
Before presenting the production-side of this model, it needs to be noted that nonhomoth-
eticity gives rise to two important implications. First, the impacts of neutral factor accumula-
tion on aggregate demand vary according to the assumed preference structures (homotheticity vs
10
non-homotheticity). Previous studies, Markusen and Venables (1998) and Markusen (2002), have
assumed an identical Cobb-Douglas utility function for the representative individual:
u = xβ · y1−β. (2.11)
This homothetic utility function gives aggregate demand for good X as follows:
Xc =
β
pX
·M = β
pX
(m ·H). (2.12)
In homothetic preference structure, the neutral factor accumulation yields a proportional increase
in the total income M and therefore a proportional increase in the aggregate demand Xc. On the
other hand, in nonhomotheticity, the neutral factor accumulation also yields an total income M
increase in the same proportion, but it would have a less impact on the aggregate demand due
to the second term in equation (2.7), −(1− β)(zH). This is one of the most important features
from the nonhomothetic preferences, making a distinction in the size of the effect of neutral factor
accumulation on aggregate demand between homotheticity and nonhomotheticity.
Second, within nonhomothetic preference structure, the positive impacts of neutral factor
accumulation on aggregate demand can be distinguished from those of per-capita income growth in
a quantitative term. Nonhomotheticity clearly implies that the effect of per-capita income growth on
aggregate demand is greater than that of neutral factor accumulation as shown in the equation (2.7).
Due to this discrepancy in effect size, a divergence in per-capita income, relative to a divergence in
neutral factor, leads to a larger difference in aggregate demand between two countries, even though
two countries have the exactly same level of total income. Therefore, the role of per-capita income
is highlighted in determining the level of direct investment done by horizontal multinationals.
In the setting assuming the homotheticity in preferences, the roles of the two fundamental
variables are not largely different in determining the level of aggregate demand. No impact differ-
entiation on aggregate demand is in fact expected between population and per-capita income. The
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effect of doubled population size on aggregate demand, for instance, is exactly identical to that of
doubled per-capita income. Moreover, the role of per-capita income has not been introduced yet
for being different in the focus. As addressed earlier, the previous studies have mainly focused on
production-side determinants in explaining the patterns of overseas investment by multinational
firms.
2.2.2 Production
In this paper, the model for the supply-side follows Markusen and Venables (1998) and
Markusen (2002), referred to as a general equilibrium oligopoly model of horizontal multinational
enterprises. Firms producing good X with increasing returns can supply their products to a foreign
market by exporting or by constructing a branch plant in the foreign country.
I will not take into account vertical motivation for direct investment. Vertical multinational
firms arise due to benefits from differences in production costs between parent and host countries.
This is less likely related to demand factors of my main interest.3
2.2.2.1 Y Industry
Let Ll be country l’s endowment of L. Production function for Y is given by:
Yl = S
α
lY · L1−αl , l = i, j, (2.13)
where SlY and Ll are skilled and unskilled labor used in Y industry in country l, respectively.
Let wS be skilled wage rate and wL be unskilled wage rate. Then, marginal products of these
factors in Y production are
wSl = α
(
SlY
Ll
)α−1
and wLl = (1− α)
(
SlY
Ll
)α
, l = i, j. (2.14)
3Furthermore, horizontal investment takes up the overwhelming proportion of total direct investment, particularly
for the U.S. outward direct investment (Markusen and Maskus, 2002).
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Expansion of X industry would lead to the movement of skilled labor from Y to X industry,
lowering SL ratio in Y industry and thus raising skilled labor costs in terms of Y . Consequently,
skilled labor supply to X industry increases with its wage rate, increasing some convexity to the
model (Markusen and Venables, 1998).
2.2.2.2 X Industry
Let c be the constant marginal production cost, t the transport costs that a national firm
exporting X to foreign market should pay, and G the plant-specific fixed costs and F the firm-
specific fixed costs. Assume that all of these cost parameters are measured in units of skilled labor
and are the same for both countries.
Let Xnij denote the sales of a country i-based national firm in market j. A national firm
produces all its products in its base country, and thus it incurs both its firm-specific and plant-
specific fixed costs, G+ F , in its base country. Moreover, it needs transport costs t per unit of X
in order to serve foreign market. Thus, one national firm’s skilled labor demand in country i is:
cXnii + (c+ t)X
n
ij +G+ F, i 6= j. (2.15)
Let Xmij denote the sales of a country i-based horizontal multinational firm in market j. A
multinational firm also needs both fixed costs for sales in its base country. One country i-based
multinational firm’s skilled labor demand in market i is:
cXmii +G+ F. (2.16)
To serve foreign market, the country i-based multinational firm should incur plant-specific fixed
costs G instead of transport costs in the foreign country j. Thus, one country i-based multinational
firm’s skilled labor demand in market j is:
cXmij +G, i 6= j. (2.17)
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Let Si be total skilled-labor endowment of country i. Let N
k
i (k = n or m) be the number
of type-k firms in country i. Then, market clearing of skilled labor factor in country i is given by
Si = SiY + (cX
n
ii + (c+ t)X
n
ij +G+ F )N
n
i + (cX
m
ii +G+ F )N
m
i + (cX
m
ij +G)N
m
j . (2.18)
2.2.3 Equilibrium
Pricing equations and free-entry conditions determine equilibrium in X industry. First, in
order to derive pricing equations, I begin with revenues for a country i-based type-k Cournot firm
serving market j: Rkij = pj(Xjc) ·Xkij , k = n or m.4 Since the price elasticity of demand is defined
as ε in the equation (2.10) and
∂Xjc
∂Xkij
= 1 by Cournot conjectures (i.e. an increase in one unit of X
in one’s own supply equals an increase in one unit of X in market supply), marginal revenues are:
∂Rkij
∂Xkij
= pj +X
k
ij
∂pj
∂Xkij
= pj +X
k
ij
∂pj
∂Xjc
∂Xjc
∂Xkij
= pj + pj
Xkij
Xjc
(
Xjc
pj
∂pj
∂Xjc
)
∂Xjc
∂Xkij
= pj
(
1− X
k
ij
Xjc
1
εj
)
.
(2.19)
Pricing equations can be written in complementary-slackness form with associated variable. Here,
complementary variables are output of firms of each type in brackets. Therefore, the expressions
for pricing equations (marginal revenue - marginal cost ≤ 0) are:
(Xnii) : pi
(
1− X
n
ii
Xic
1
εi
)
≤ qic, (2.20)
(Xnij) : pj
(
1− X
n
ij
Xjc
1
εj
)
≤ qi(c+ t), (2.21)
(Xmii ) : pi
(
1− X
m
ij
Xic
1
εi
)
≤ qic, and (2.22)
(Xmij ) : pj
(
1− X
m
ij
Xjc
1
εj
)
≤ qjc. (2.23)
4Hereafter, for the price expression of good X I drop the subscript X.
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With transposition of several terms and substitutions of the equation (2.10) and (2.7) for ε
and Xc,
5 I yield the expressions for output:
Xnii ≥
pi − qic
pi
· εi ·Xic = β · pi − qic
pi2
·mi ·Hi, (2.24)
Xnij ≥
pj − qi(c+ t)
pj
· εj ·Xjc = β · pj − qi(c+ t)
pj2
·mj ·Hj , (2.25)
Xmii ≥
pi − qic
pi
· εi ·Xic = β · pi − qic
pi2
·mi ·Hi, and (2.26)
Xmij ≥
pj − qjc
pj
· εj ·Xjc = β · pj − qjc
pj2
·mj ·Hj . (2.27)
Each of these inequalities holds with equality if the right hand side is greater than zero, otherwise
output is zero.
Production regime is the combination of firm types that operate in equilibrium. Zero-profit
conditions represent free entry of firms of each type and determine the production regime.
Let ηkij (k = n or m) denote proportional markups of price over marginal cost. For example,
ηmij is one country i-based multinational firm’s markup in market j. That is, η
m
ij =
Xmij
Xjc
1
εj
. I can
then obtain markup revenues per unit on a type-k firm as market price times its markup in that
market. For instance, marginal markup revenues on a country i-based multinational firm in market
j are pjη
m
ij = pj − qjc from the equation (2.23). Subsequently, total markup revenues on type-k
firms can be written as:
for a country i-based national firm : piη
n
iiX
n
ii + pjη
n
ijX
n
ij , (2.28)
for a country j-based national firm : pjη
n
jjX
n
jj + piη
n
jiX
n
ji, (2.29)
for a country i-based multinational firm : piη
m
iiX
m
ii + pjη
m
ijX
m
ij , and (2.30)
for a country j-based multinational firm : pjη
m
jjX
m
jj + piη
m
jiX
m
ji . (2.31)
5Here, ε ·Xc = βp ·m ·H since ε = mm−m0 in equation (2.10) and Xc = βp (m ·H)− (1− β)zH = βp (m−m0)H in
equation (2.7), where m0 ≡ (1−β)p·z
β
.
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If outputs are positive, then the equations (2.24)-(2.27) and (2.28)-(2.31) can be used for
generating the free entry conditions (i.e. profits = total markup revenues - total fixed costs ≤ 0),
where complementary variables are the number of firms of each type.
(Nni ) : β
[(
pi − c
pi
)2
·mi ·Hi +
(
pj − c− t
pj
)2
·mj ·Hj
]
≤ qi(G+ F ), (2.32)
(Nnj ) : β
[(
pj − c
pj
)2
·mj ·Hj +
(
pi − c− t
pi
)2
·mi ·Hi
]
≤ qj(G+ F ), (2.33)
(Nmi ) : β
[(
pi − c
pi
)2
·mi ·Hi +
(
pj − c
pj
)2
·mj ·Hj
]
≤ qi(G+ F ) + qjG, and (2.34)
(Nmj ) : β
[(
pj − c
pj
)2
·mj ·Hj +
(
pi − c
pi
)2
·mi ·Hi
]
≤ qj(G+ F ) + qiG. (2.35)
2.3 Impact Effects
To grasp intuition to results in the general equilibrium for demand-driven factors, this section
conducts the impact effects explicated in Markusen (2002).6 Here, using the free entry conditions
(2.32)-(2.35) derived the above, I analyze how a change in one variable leads to changes in both
the aggregate demand and equilibrium regimes.
To easily understand the impact effects, I first need to simplify the free entry conditions
(2.32)-(2.35). Let β
(
pl−c
pl
)2
, β
(
pl−c−t
pl
)2
, ql(G+ F ), and qlG denote al, bl, dl, and el (l = i or j),
respectively. Then, transposition of all terms of fixed costs to the left hand side in the equations
(2.32)-(2.35) gives expressions for profits of country l-based type-k firm, denoted by Πkl (l = i or
j, and k = n or m). Thus, the free entry conditions (2.32)-(2.35) can be simplified as the following
profit equations:
Πni = ai ·mi ·Hi + bj ·mj ·Hj − di (2.36)
Πnj = aj ·mj ·Hj + bi ·mi ·Hi − dj (2.37)
6Given that all other endogenous variables are fixed, this analysis technique demonstrates how a change in one
variable yields a change in an equilibrium result. Even though this is not the effects of general equilibrium, the
analysis helps predict results in the general equilibrium.
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Πmi = ai ·mi ·Hi + aj ·mj ·Hj − di − ej , and (2.38)
Πmj = aj ·mj ·Hj + ai ·mi ·Hi − dj − ei, (2.39)
where al, bl, dl, and el (l = i or j) are all strictly positive. For more simplicity of analysis, I add
one more assumption that both countries are initially identical. Accordingly, price elasticities, per-
capita incomes, the numbers of population (neutral factor), threshold incomes, all kind of prices,
all kind of fixed costs, and so forth are initially equal in the two countries. That is, ε ≡ εi = εj ,
m ≡ mi = mj , H ≡ Hi = Hj , m0 ≡ m0i = m0j , a ≡ ai = aj > b ≡ bi = bj , d ≡ di = dj , and
e ≡ ei = ej .
For convenience, let Πn ≡ Πni = Πnj denote initial (ex-ante) profits of a national firm, Πm ≡
Πmi = Π
m
j denote initial (ex-ante) profits of a multinational firm, and Π
n′ and Πm′ denote ex-post
profits of a national and multinational firm, respectively.
2.3.1 Impacts of a Change in World Aggregate Demand (per-capita income vs
population)
As the first analysis of impact effects, consider the impacts of a change in world aggregate
demand, all other things unchanged.7 Recall that aggregate demand grows through an increase
either in per-capita income (productivity) or in neutral factor (population). First, consider
the impacts of world aggregate demand growth arising from an equal per-capita income increase
in both countries. An equal per-capita income increase in both countries would lead to world total
income growth and subsequently world aggregate demand (see the equation (2.7)). Figure 2.2 (A)
illustrates an Engel curve in the case of a per-capita income growth for a country, and describes
how aggregate demand varies with total income arising from a per-capita income growth. The
growth of per-capita income leads to an increase in both total income level (from M to M ′) and
aggregate demand (from point A to B).
Now, consider the effect of aggregate demand growth through an increase in per-capita income
7Here, I consider the case of an increase in aggregate demand only. The results from a decrease in aggregate
demand would be directly opposite to the increase case.
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Figure 2.2: Engel Curves in a Per-capita Income Growth (A) vs a Neutral Factor Accumulation
(B)
on the profits for country l-based type-k firm specifically. Suppose that an equal per-capita income
level for both countries increases by ∆m > 0. Then, the ex-post profits of firm type-k are:
Πn′ = Πni
′ = Πnj
′ = a ·H · (m+ ∆m) + b ·H · (m+ ∆m)− d
= Πn + (a+ b) ·H ·∆m
(2.40)
Πm′ = Πmi
′ = Πmj
′ = a ·H · (m+ ∆m) + a ·H · (m+ ∆m)− d− e
= Πm + 2a ·H ·∆m
(2.41)
An increase in world aggregate demand through an equal per-capita income growth gives a general
result that ∆Πmi = ∆Π
m
j > ∆Π
n
i = ∆Π
n
j > 0. Because a > b from whether the trade costs exist, the
growth of world aggregate demand increases more revenues for multinational firms than for national
firms, while there are no changes in fixed costs for the two firm types. This positive influence of
world aggregate demand (and market) growth has been found in relevant oligopoly models including
this model, but not in monopolistic-competition models (Markusen, 2002). Besides, it has been
strongly supported by a wealth of empirical evidences (e.g. Carr et al., 2001). For these respects,
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I prefer this oligopoly model to a monopolistic-competition model.8
Second, consider the impacts of world aggregagte demand growth arising from neutral factor
(population) accumulation. A neutral factor growth similarly gives rise to an increase in aggregate
demand whenever β·mp − (1 − β)z > 0 (see the equation (2.7)). Meanwhile, an increased size in
aggregate demand of good X is relatively smaller in this case of neutral factor accumulation than
in the above case of per-capita income growth.
Figure 2.2 (B) illustrates that an accumulation of the neutral factor makes a less increase in
aggregate demand for a country, relative to the case of a per-capita income growth. As the neutral
factor in a country increases, total income as well as Z grow and subsequently aggregate demand
also moves along with a ray from the origin through the point A. Note that the slope of the ray
from the origin through the point A or C in Figure 2.2 (B) is much steeper than that of the ray
from the point A to B in Figure 2.2 (A).
Suppose that an equal level of neutral factor (population) for both countries accumulates by
∆H > 0. Then, the ex-post profits of firm type-k are:
Πn′ = Πni
′ = Πnj
′ = a ·m · (H + ∆H) + b ·m · (H + ∆H)− d
= Πn + (a+ b) ·m ·∆H
(2.42)
Πm′ = Πmi
′ = Πmj
′ = a ·m · (H + ∆H) + a ·m · (H + ∆H)− d− e
= Πm + 2a ·m ·∆H
(2.43)
Whenever βmp − (1 − β)z > 0, a less increase in aggregate demand through a neutral factor
growth also shows the general result that ∆Πmi = ∆Π
m
j > ∆Π
n
i = ∆Π
n
j > 0.
8On the other hand, a monopolistic-competition model has an advantage in that good X can be differentiated.
19
2.3.2 Impacts of a Difference in Aggregate Demand (per-capita income vs popu-
lation)
Next, consider the impacts of a difference in aggregate demand between the two countries,
all other things unchanged. In this paper, I assume that country i is always larger in either per-
capita income or neutral factor. First, consider the impacts of a difference in aggregate demand
arising from a divergence in per-capita income. A divergence in per-capita income between the two
countries causes a difference in total income and subsequently makes a (considerable) difference in
aggregate demand, represented in the Figure 2.3 (A).
Figure 2.3: Engel Curves in a Divergence in Per-capita Income (A) vs a Divergence in Neutral
Factor (B)
Now, consider the effect of a divergence in per-capita income on the profits for each type
firm. In this case, as two countries differ in per-capita income, suppose that country i’s per capita
income level increases by ∆m while country j’s per capita income level decreases by ∆m in order
to make all other things including total world income unchanged. Then, the ex-post profits of firm
type-k are:
Πni
′ = a ·H (mi + ∆m) + b ·H (mj −∆m)− d
= Πni + (a− b) ·H ·∆m
(2.44)
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Πnj
′ = a ·H (mj −∆m) + b ·H (mi + ∆m)− d
= Πnj + (b− a) ·H∆m
(2.45)
Πm′ = Πmi
′ = Πmj
′ = a ·H (m+ ∆m) + a ·H (m−∆m)− d− e
= Πm
(2.46)
A difference in aggregate demand through a per-capita income divergence gives a general
result that ∆Πni > 0, ∆Π
n
j < 0, and ∆Π
m
i = ∆Π
m
j = 0. Because a > b from whether the trade
costs exist and there are no changes in fixed costs for two firm types, larger demands in the country
i increase country i-based national firm’s profits, while smaller demands in the country j decrease
country j-based national firm’s profits. On the other hand, the profits of multinational firms remain
unchanged.
This analysis about the effect of per-capita income divergence on multinational firm’s ac-
tivities is closely related to the well-known Linder hypothesis of main interest in this paper. The
hypothesis implies that countries with similar per-capita income levels possess similar demands for
goods and services. It therefore suggests that understanding how the composition of household
demand changes with per-capita income may play a significant role in determining trade patterns.
Thus, there have been numerous studies on the Linder effect in order to account for global trade
patterns. Yet the Linder effect might also matter in explaining global FDI patterns since each firm
can have another strategic option to serve foreign markets as FDI, which replace trade in some
circumstances (e.g. the presence of high trade costs). From the result in this sub-section with sim-
ulation results in the next section, I find the evidence supporting for the Linder effect in horizontal
FDI patterns.
Second, consider the impacts of a difference in aggregate demand arising from a divergence
in neutral factor. Recall that the divergence in neutral factor makes a less difference in aggregate
demand, compared to the divergence in per-capita income, illustrated in Figure 2.3 (B). In other
words, the divergence in neutral factor is likely to keep similarity in aggregate demand.
Now, consider the effect of a divergence in neutral factor on the profits for each type firm. In
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this case, as two countries differ in neutral factor, suppose that country i’s number of population
increases by ∆H, while country j’s number of population decreases by ∆H in order to make all
other things including world total income unchanged. Then, the ex-post profits of firm type-k are:
Πni
′ = a ·m (Hi + ∆H) + b ·m (Hj −∆H)− d
= Πni + (a− b) ·m ·∆H
(2.47)
Πnj
′ = a ·m (Hj −∆H) + b ·m (Hi + ∆H)− d
= Πnj + (b− a) ·m ·∆H
(2.48)
Πm′ = Πmi
′ = Πmj
′ = a ·m (Hi + ∆H) + a ·m (Hj −∆H)− d− e
= Πm
(2.49)
The changed profits for each type firm are qualitatively similar to the case of a divergence
in per-capita income. However, it should be noted again that as per-capita income and neutral
factor differ in the size of their effect on aggregate demand, the changed size of the profits that the
difference in aggregate demand generates also varies with where the difference in aggregate demand
comes from.
So far, a change in either per-capita income or neutral factor makes not only a change in total
income but also a change in aggregate demand. To remove the effect of a change in total income on
aggregate demand, now consider that a per-capita income increases but a neutral factor decreases
for country i, whereas reversely a per-capita income decreases but a neutral factor increases for
country j, holding total income in both countries constant and identical.
Figure 2.4 illustrates this situation, which implies that the two countries have an identical
level of total income, but country i has a larger aggregate demand than country j due to a higher
per-capita income in spite of a less level of neutral factor. Therefore, the changed profits for each
type firm are also qualitatively similar to the case of a divergence in per-capita income. Country i-
based national firms obtain more total revenues, but country j-based national firms lose some total
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Figure 2.4: Engel Curves in a Reverse Divergence in Per-capita Income and Neutral Factor between
Two Countries, Holding Total Incomes for Two Countries Identical and Constant
revenues, holding total costs unchanged. On the other hand, the profits for multinational firms in
both countries remain unchanged. The analysis which is exactly the same as here can be found in
Markusen (2013). In this paper, it is included to show the importance of a similarity in per capita
income for horizontal multinational firms, regardless of whether two countries have an identical
total income. Later, this important result is associated with a main empirical specification.
2.4 Simulation
In this section, I first show a benchmark simulation result after describing a numerical general-
equilbrium model under non-homothetic preferences. Then, I analyze how various changes in
demand-driven characteristics for two countries influence equilibrium regimes.
2.4.1 Benchmark Simulation Result under Non-homothetic Preferences
There are difficulties when one analytically solves the general equilibrium model outlined
above because the model has many demensions and many inequalities. Alternatively, I first for-
mulate the model as a nonlinear complementary problem in which there are a set of inequalities
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and each of these inequalities is expressed with an associated non-negative variable.9 Then, I ex-
ploit MPSGE (mathematical programming system for general equilibrium), a sub-system of GAMS
(general algebraic modelling system), developed by Rutherford (1999) in order to solve the model
numerically. The numerical model of general equilibrium includes forty-three inequalities each with
complementary variables in forty-three unknowns (See Appendix A for the numerical model and
the initial calibration of the model).
In the benchmark simulation, I use the values of parameters as follows: non-country-specific
z as the endowment good is 30, the transport cost t is 0.15, and the ratio of a multinational firm’s
fixed costs to national firm’s fixed costs is 1.45 (= 85.5) if wages between two countries are the same.
Figure 2.5: Equilibrium Regimes under Non-homothetic Preferences (z = zi = zj = 30)
Figure 2.5 shows the equilibrium regimes over these parameter values in the world Edgeworth
box, in which horizontal axis is the total world endowment of unskilled labor, and vertical axis is
the total world endowment of skilled labor.10 The origin of country i is the southwest (SW) corner
9Two possibilities exist. The variable is strictly positive if equality holds for the inequality in equilibrium. On the
other hand, it has the value of zero if strict inequality holds in equilibrium.
10Each axis is divided into nineteen sections, signifying five-percent difference between adjacent two cells. Each
edge of all cells in the square box indicates a distribution of the world endowments of both factors between the two
countries.
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in the box while the origin of country j is the northeast (NE) corner.11 Note that any point on
the NW-SE diagonal of the box implies that the two countries differ in relative endowments, while
any point on the SW-NE diagonal implies that the countries have the same relative endowments
but differ in the number of total labor forces.
Figure 2.5 is derived from the assumption that the countries have identical but non-homothetic
preferences, where zi = zj = 30 in the equation (2.1). A color of each cell in the panel represents
an equilibrium regime. The figure is similar to the Figure 5.1 of Markusen (2002), which is derived
from the assumption that the countries have identical homothetic preferences (zi = zj = 0), in that
only multinational firms are active in general equilibrium around the center of the Edgeworth box,
only national firms exist in equilibrium at the edges of the box, and in between are co-existence
area of both multinational and national firms. Therefore, regardless of whether assumed prefer-
ences are homothetic or non-homothetic, the central findings in Markusen and Venables (1998) and
Markusen (2002) are preserved: horizontal multinational firms are more likely found in equilibrium
when both market size and relative endowments are similar between the two countries.
2.4.2 Impacts of a Change in World Aggregate Demand in General Equilibrium
First, consider the impacts of a change in world aggregate demand in general equilibrium. As
mentioned in the previous section, aggregate demand growth comes through an increase in either
per-capita income or neutral factor. I predict that equilibrium regimes by these two demand factors
are qualitatively similar in that an increase in either per-capita income or neutral factor gives a
more advantage to multinational firms, but quantitatively different each other because the effect of
per-capita income growth on aggregate demand is greater than that of neutral factor.
As the first experiment, suppose that world aggregate demand growth comes through an
increase in per-capita income. Figure 2.6 (A) shows the equilibrium regimes solved numerically for
this first experiment. While all parameter values are the same as in the benchmark case (Figure
11From the origin for country i, a movement to the right means an increase in country i’s share of the world
unskilled-labor endowment, and a shift to the top means an increase in country i’s share of the world skilled-labor
endowment.
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2.5), only scale parameters of per-capita income for two countries equally rise by 33%. As predicted,
Figure 2.6 (A) shows that the regions in which only national firms are active shrink, and the area
in which multinational firms exist expands. The equally increased per-capita income in the two
countries leads to an increase in the world total income, and also extends world aggregate demand.
As total markup revenues are differently affected across firm types, multinational firms has an
advantage in profits over national firms.
Figure 2.6: Equilibrium Regimes under World Aggregate Demand Growth through Per-capita
Income (A) vs Neutral Factor Accumulation (B)
Second, suppose that world aggregate demand growth comes through an accumulation of
neutral factor. In previous section, I analyze that a neutral factor accumulation leads to a less
increase in aggregate demand, relative to the above case. It is thus conjectured that multinational
firms has a less advantage in total markup revenues, compared to the above case. Figure 2.6 (B)
shows the equilibrium regimes solved numerically in the case of an equal accumulation of neutral
factor. While all parameter values are the same as in benchmark case, only scale parameters of
population in the two countries rise by 33%. Note that the level of total income increases by 33%
in both cases (per-capita income growth and neutral factor accumulation). As predicted, Figure
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2.6 (B) shows a similar change in the equilibrium regimes compared to the Figure 2.6 (A), but
the area that support the existence of multinational firms is smaller with Figure 2.6 (B). The
equal population growth in the two countries leads to an increase in the world total income. It also
increases the threshold income level to buy good X as another important component in determining
aggregate demand, forcing an increased size of aggregate demand in the population growth smaller
than in the per-capita income growth. Hence, the population growth in the two countries makes a
less change in the equilibrium regimes.
2.4.3 Impacts of a Difference in Aggregate Demand in General Equilibrium
Next, I consider how a difference in aggregate demand between the two countries affects the
equilibrium regimes. First, I make a divergence of per-capita income between the two countries. As
analyzed in earlier section, this creates considerably different aggregate demand between the two
local markets. I conjecture that larger demands in the country i reinforce country i-based national
firm’s profits while smaller demands in the country j reduce country j-based national firm’s profits.
On the other hand, the profits of multinational firms remain unchanged.
Figure 2.7 (A) shows how equilibrium regimes change from the benchmark result when per-
capita income levels between the two countries are not symmetric. Per-capita income level is 33%
larger than the benchmark case for country i, but 33% smaller for country j. As expected, the exis-
tence area of country i-based national firms makedly expands and that of country i-based national
firms signally shrinks. Moreover, the region where multinational firms arise is also remarkably
reduced. When comparing between Figure 2.5 (the benchmark case) and Figure 2.7 (A), one finds
that the central point, in a sense of the regime where multinational firms exist only, shifts to the
southwest. The difference in aggregate demand also changes the point where wages for skilled labor
are the same in both countries. On the SW-NE diagonal, the southwest part from the central point
indicates that wages for skilled labor in country i with large demands are lower, while northeast
part indicates that wages for skilled labor in country j with small demands are lower. Thus, these
features discourage the existence of horizontal multinational firms in the northeast part.
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Figure 2.7: Equilibrium Regimes under Difference in Aggregate Demand through Per-capita Income
Divergence (A) vs Neutral Factor Divergence (B)
Second, I make a divergence of population size between the two countries. As also analyzed
in earlier section, this divergence creates a less different aggregate demand between the two local
markets, relative to the above case of the per-capita income divergence. I thus conjecture that a
divergence in neutral factor influences equilibrium regimes in a similar manner to the above case,
but less affects their changes.
Equilibrium regimes are shown in Figure 2.7 (B) when world distribution of population be-
tween the two countries is asymmetric. The number of population is 33% larger than the benchmark
case for country i, but 33% smaller for country j. As expected, the region where country i-based
national firms operate somewhat expands, but the existence area of country i-based national firms
and that of multinational firms slightly decline.
Finally, without any total income change in each country compared to the benchmark case,
I make an inverse change in per-capita income and population size for each country. Per-capita
income and population size are double and half those in the benchmark case for country i, respec-
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tively, while they reversely change for country j. Note that country i is 4 times larger in per-capita
income than country j, but 4 times smaller in population size. Figure 2.8 shows that the changed
profits for each type firm are also qualitatively similar to the case of a divergence in per-capita
income, but some of the effect of a divergence in per-capita income on profits is offset by that of a
divergence in neutral factor. It also highlights that a similarity in per-capita income plays a major
role on horizontal FDI.
Figure 2.8: Equilibrium Regimes for a Reverse Divergence in Per-capita Income and Neutral Factor
between Two Countries, Holding Total Incomes for Two Countries Identical and Constant
2.4.4 Impacts of a Change in Each Production-side Factor in General Equilibrium
The literature includes analyses about the impacts of a difference in wages, a change in
the ratio of firm-specific fixed costs to plant-specific fixed costs, and a change in transport costs.
Because the impacts of these factors do not depend on demand structure, the results are the same
as those in the literature (Markusen and Venables, 1998 and Markusen, 2002). Here, I simply
discuss with simulation results.
First, consider the impacts of a difference in relative labor endowments. All figures in
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this paper commonly shows that a large divergence in relative labor endowments discourages
the existence of horizontal multinationals, consistent with previous studies. When I look at
the NW corner in Figure 2.5 (the benchmark case), abundant skilled labor in country i lowers
its wage, and therefore the changed profits for each country-type firm form the following order:
∆Πni > ∆Π
m
i > 0 > ∆Π
m
j > ∆Π
n
j . Thus, only national firms are active at NW and SE edges in all
figures.
Figure 2.9: Equilibrium Regimes for Changes in Trade Costs and Fixed Costs
Second, consider the impact of a change in trade costs. Figure 2.9 (A) shows how equilibrium
regimes are modified when I lower trade costs from 15% of marginal cost to 12%. A decrease in
trade costs gives national firms an advantage.
Finally, consider the impact of a change in fixed costs. In Figure 2.9 (B), a ratio of multi-
national’s fixed costs to national firm’s fixed costs changes from 1.45 to 1.6. This change implies
that investment costs for multinational firms only rise. It relatively improves the profitability of
national firms.
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2.5 Concluding Remarks
Recently trade literature has adopted nonhomothetic preferences in the demand-side of a
traditional model. By doing so, a number of economists not only have acknowledged the importance
of demand-side determinants in explaining trade flows and patterns but they have also helped
understand diverse phenomena associated with international trade. Due to much more complicated
patterns of MNE behavior and FDI, relative to trade, little investigation has concentrated on the
demand-side issues in the FDI literature. Only market size variables have mainly been used as a
demand-driven determinant of FDI, particularly within the KC framework.
In this chapter, a simple nonhomothetic preference structure was incorporated into the pre-
vious oligopoly model of horizontal MNEs underlying the standard KC theory. Connecting the
implications from nonhomothetic preferences to the features of horizontal FDI suggests that per-
capita income’s growth effect and the Linder effect matters for FDI, independent of roles of market
size and neutral factor.
These main consequences provide basic guidelines for a subsequent empirical study. First,
the effect of world market growth in the previous research can be decomposed into the effects
of the two demand factors, per-capita income and neutral factor. As per-capita income plays a
leading role in determining aggregate demand, the positive impact of per-capita income growth on
horizontal FDI is expected to emerge regardless of whether neutral factor is controlled for. Second,
this paper conjectures that a divergence in per-capita income level among countries remarkably
reduces horizontal FDI. The negative impact would significantly remain regardless of whether the
variable of difference in neutral factor is controlled for. It is also expected to emerge when total
income levels for countries are controlled for.
Chapter 3
LINDER EFFECT FOR OUTWARD FDI OF SOUTH KOREA: EVIDENCE
FROM A KNOWLEDGE-CAPITAL APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
A large body of literature analyzing patterns of foreign direct investment (FDI) been dom-
inated in the last decades by studies on production-side determinants. Numerous studies have
accordingly focused on diverse supply-side reasons - factor endowments, productivity, trade costs,
investment barriers, taxes, infrastructure, and so on. For the reason, research on demand-side
determinants is scarce in the literature.
For analytical manageability, previous theoretical studies typically assume that a represen-
tative comsumer’s preferences are homothetic in the demand-side of their models. However, an
alternative view that the assumption of homothetic preferences is not appropriate recently rapidly
spreads for better understanding of flows and patterns of FDI as well as trade. In particular,
traditional trade models where tastes are not homothetic are highly stylized. Empirical evidence
supports that preferences in real world are much closer to be non-homothetic.1
In this chapter, depending on the implications from the non-homothetic preferences, I empir-
ically explore the influences of demand-driven factors to understand FDI flows and patterns. This
empirical study is based on the chapter 2 in this dissertation, which argues the significant relevance
between per-capita income and overseas activities of horizontal multinational enterprises (MNEs)
1As an example, Hunter and Markusen (1988) provide an empirical demonstration of non-homothetic preferences
as their estimates of income elasticity of demand for the bulk of consumption goods are statistically different from
one.
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by examining the impacts of market size, neutral factor, and per-capita income as demand-driven
factors and by comparing their relative importance.
More specifically, this paper focuses on the commonly known Linder effect for FDI by extend-
ing the existing empirical knowledge-capital (KC) model (of Carr et al., 2001).2 Chapter 2 shows
that as non-homothetic preferences are introduced into the demand-side of a previous traditional
model for horizontal FDI, the impacts of growth and similarity of per-capita income on horizontal
MNEs’ overseas activities are overwhelming those of population and market size. Thus, the Linder
hypothesis is now open to further empirical investigation.3
Chapter 2 also suggests that the Linder effect is important (1) regardless of controlling
for population variables as per-capita income plays a predominant role in determining aggregate
demand level; and (2) after controlling for total income variables as a divergence in per-capita
income between two countries, holding total income identical and constant, is expected to discourage
horizontal FDI. In addition, the other points to be checked include: whether the inclusion of another
determinants, such as infrastructure and institution, affects the Linder effect; whether the Linder
effect holds for FDI experiences of diverse countries; and whether there is a difference in the Linder
effect across per-capita income levels of host countries. This chapter investigates the above all
concerns.
This paper attempts to explain Korean multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) experience with
57 host countries over the period after the financial crisis (1999-2010), based on the KC model.
Most empirical papers based on the KC theory have mainly used data by the U.S. multinationals.
This is primarily due to availability of FDI data suitable for a study’s purpose. Relative to other
host countries, the U.S. is not only much larger in total income, per-capita income, and population,
but also much more abundant in relative skilled labor endowments. The analysis using only U.S.
FDI data can be a problem which places a limitation on parameter space and therefore distorts
empirical results because the U.S. is one of two countries in every country-pair observation (Carr
2Here, the Linder effect for FDI means that the similarity in per-capita income matters for horizontal FDI.
3Carr et al. (2001) show that the similarity in market size exerts a positive impact on horizontal FDI.
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et al., 2003). For this reason, it might be interesting that this paper applies for outward FDI of
Korea, which is less large and less skilled-labor-abundant than the U.S.
This paper adopts an advanced estimator of the generalized methods of moments (GMM)
approach, referred to as the system GMM (hereafter, System GMM), given the availability of a
dynamic panel data. The System GMM estimator has little been employed in estimating the KC
model though the estimator controls for all econometirc issues and concerns to be considered.
This chapter reports robust empirical results on the Linder effect for FDI consistent with
the predictions from the chapter 2. As conjectured, the similarity in per-capita income level was
significant for Korean investors, implying that the Linder hypothesis holds for FDI at highly aggre-
gated level. It is estimated that a 10% decrease in per-capita income divergences between Korea
and an average host country leads to a 8.6% rise in Korean overseas direct investment. There was
no change in the main results both across different specifications and for the U.S. FDI data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the patterns and
trends of Korean outward FDI in multiple aspects to help understand empirical analysis later.
Section 3.3 sets up the empirical model, considers the estimation methodology, and presents the
data. Section 3.4 discusses the estimation results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Patterns and Structural Features of Korean Outward FDI
This section summarizes patterns and structural features of Korea’s outward FDI. It presents
common views shown in previous studies for Korea’s outward FDI.4
There has been a number of changes in various aspects of Korea’s outward FDI. First, in
Korean policy and system toward FDI, Korean government has gradually liberalized FDI since
foreign investment began to be institutionalized in 1968. In 1997, it completed to liberalize FDI by
allowing multinational firms a simple report without prior government approval. In annual total
volume (see Figure 3.1), outward FDI accordingly amounted to US$1 billion in the late 1980s, rose
steadily after then, and reached US$7.1 billion in 1996. It dwindled during the financial crisis of
4The previous studies include Ha (2010), Chun and Kwon (2007), Lee (2003 and 2004), and Kim and Rhe (2009).
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1997-98, but it has turned to a rising streak since 2000 (US$6.2 billion). Since 2005 (US$9.7 billion),
it has shown a rapid increase (US$19.4 billion in 2006 and US$36.8 billion in 2008). Therefore,
an analysis over the period after both achieving the liberalization of FDI and escaping from the
financial crisis impact might be reasonable for Korea.
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp)
Figure 3.1: Trends of Korean Outward FDI
Second, I look at changes of Korean outward FDI in structural features, helping my analysis
on the determinants of Korean outward FDI. According to the comparison of outward FDI by
Korean multinationals across regions (Table 3.1), Asia ranks first in the cumulative amount of
Korean outward FDI. FDI into the Asian region is mainly driven by medium and small businesses,
and it is characterized by the highest proportion of FDI into manufacturing industry. Over the
period of 1999-2010, it is also about half of the share of total volume of Korean outward FDI.
Because almost all countries in the Asian region, excluding Japan, are developing countries, it has
a motivation of vertical FDI that exploits low wage rates from abundant unskilled labor endowments
in this region.
North America ranked second and Europe ranked third can commonly be characterized by
large size of market (demand). FDI to these two regions is expected to be horizontal FDI motivated
by incentives to reduce trade costs and by incentives to capture demands as horizontal MNEs
construct production facilities in such regions. FDI to other regions (Middle and South America,
Middle-East Asia, Africa, and Oceania) is commonly characterized by a relatively low share of FDI
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Table 3.1: Trends of Korean Outward FDI across Regions
1999-2004 2005-2010 1980-2012
Regions Total for 6 years Share Total for 6 years Share Total for entire years Share
(Millions of dollars) (%) (Millions of dollars) (%) (Millions of dollars) (%)
Asia 18,664 46 70,050 45 132,850 41
North America 9,106 24 29,760 21 75,180 23
Europe 6,015 15 25,083 14 46,133 14
Other America 1,153 3 6,913 4 14,604 4
Others 4,630 12 29,261 18 58,776 18
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (http;//www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp)
into manufacturing industry and a relatively high share of FDI into natural resource industry. It
thus seems to include a significant proportion of a natural resource FDI.
When I look at trends of Korean outward FDI across countries, Table 3.2 presents the bias of
Korean outward FDI to the U.S. and China. In the share of the cumulative total amount of FDI,
the U.S. and China have attracted 20% and 17% of Korean outward FDI, respectively. Another
trend is that there have been diversified in host countries after the beginning of a surge in outward
FDI since 2005.
Table 3.2: Trends of Korean Outward FDI across Countries
1999-2004 2005-2010 1980-2012
Countries Total for 6 years Share Total for 6 years Share Total for entire years Share
(Millions of dollars) (%) (Millions of dollars) (%) (Millions of dollars) (%)
United States 8,877 22 23,337 14 64,338 20
China 11,295 29 27,300 17 56,687 17
Hong Kong 1,511 4 10,403 6 17,524 5
Vietnam 1,740 4 9,988 6 15,307 5
Australia 510 1 3,147 2 14,450 4
Netherlands 2,202 6 5,404 3 11,255 3
Indonesia 877 2 4,021 2 10,894 3
Canada 229 1 6,423 4 10,842 3
United Kingdom 1,041 3 6,271 4 10,639 3
Malaysia 302 1 8,459 5 10,320 2
Others 10,984 28 56,315 35 105,287 32
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (http;//www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp)
By industry, Korean outward FDI has mostly been headed for manufacturing and service
industries. It is remarkable that declines in FDI into the manufacturing industry and rises in
FDI into service industry are a recent trend. Korean overseas investment has actively been made
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in competitive sub-industries within the manufacturing industry. By firm size, outward FDI was
initially begun by large Korean firms, was gradually increased by competitive medium and small
businesses, and has finally been extended to individuals as it was completely liberalized. When I
look at changes in the owned shares of subsidiary by Korean investors in Ha (2010), the owned
share of 100% had decreased from 75% to 50% during the initial period (1980-1995), but after the
period its trend has been turned to increase by 70% in 2006-2009. The trend of the owned share
of more than 50% shows the opposite of that of 100%. This pattern arises due to regulations on
inward FDI in host countries. An analysis by FDI types is not easy due to the limitations of data
availability. The main trend seems that greenfield investment has accounted for an absolutely large
proportion, but merger and acquisition investment is recently rapidly increasing.
By purpose of outward FDI, two main, horizontal and vertical, incentives for FDI have
attracted most Korean outward FDI as well. In both total volume of FDI and FDI into the
manufacturing industry, this pattern is similar. A recent distinct difference of trends between
horizontal and vertical FDI is that Korean mutinationals are sharply expanding their horizontal
investment, but vertical FDI is somewhat on the decline (See Kim and Rhe, 2009).
3.3 Empirical Model, Estimation Approach, and Data
3.3.1 Empirical Model
Basic theoretical foundations of this paper come from the standard KC model incorporating
both horizontal and vertical motivations for FDI into a framework. The KC model provides its
predictions as follows. Unless parent and host countries have similarities in both market size and
relative factor endowment and trade costs are low, two major types of MNEs emerge. First, in the
presence of both increasing returns and imperfect competition, horizontal MNEs will be dominant
when two countries have similarities in both market size and relative factor endowment but trade
costs are sufficiently high. If there is a difference in market size, MNEs in relatively large country
would be unwilling to invest in costly capacity in relatively small country. If there is a difference
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in relative factor endowment, MNEs in relative skilled-labor-abundant country have incentives to
outsource unskilled-labor-intensive production activities to countries with relative skilled-labor-
abundance. This difference in relative factor endowment is a main ground of the emergence of
vertical MNEs, the other major type of MNEs. In vertical FDI, low trade barriers of parent
country also matter because the substantial amount of final goods should be returned back to
parent country.
Theoretical analyses of the chapter 2 exclude vertical MNEs because vertical FDI mainly seeks
benefits from reducing production costs and therefore it is unlikely associated with demand-driven
determinants. However, my empirical investigation in this chapter includes vertical motivations
since the distinction between horizontal and vertical FDI is possible only in theory yet FDI data
by the distinction are not available for most countries including Korea.
The main empirical specification is based on the main regression equation used in Carr. et al
(2001) that estimates the standard KC model. However, it can be extended by adding per-capita
income variables. The theoretical conjectures of chapter 2 include that holding total income
identical and constant, a divergence in per-capita income between two countries is expected
to discourage horizontal FDI (see Figure 2.8). This implies that independent of variables of total
income (or market size), measured by GDP, the similarity in per-capita income are important for
horizontal FDI. Therefore, I begin with the following basic estimating equation for FDI from Korea
(h) to host country (f) in year t (t = 1999, 2000, · · · , 2010).
ROFDIhft = β0 + β1 × (ROFDIhft−1) + β2 × (Sum GDPhft) + β3 × (GDP Diff Sqhft)
+ β4 × (HC Diffhft) + β5 × (GDP Diffhft ×HC Diffhft)
+ β6 × (IBft) + β7 × (TCht) + β8 × (TCft) + β9 × (HC Diff Sqhft × TCft)
+ β10 × (Sum GDPPChft) + β11 × (GDPPC Diff Sqhft)
+ β12 × (GDPPC Diffhft ×HC Diffhft) + εhft.
(3.1)
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ROFDIhft: FDI from Korean multinationals to a host country f in year t (US$)
ROFDIhft−1: FDI from Korean multinationals to a host country f in year t− 1 (US$)
Sum GDPhft: Sum of real GDP of Korea and a host country f (US$)
GDP Diff Sqhft: Square of difference in real GDP between Korea and a host country f
HC Diffhft: Difference in index of human capital between Korea and a host country f
GDP Diffhft ×HC Diffhft: Product of difference in real GDP and difference in index of human capital
IBft: Barriers for FDI in a host country f
TCht: Costs when exporting final goods back from a host country f to Korea
TCft: Costs when exporting intermediate goods from Korea to a host country f
HC Diff Sqhft × TCft: Product of square of difference in index of human capital and costs when exporting inter-
mediate goods from Korea to a host country f
Sum GDPPChft: Sum of real GDP per capita of Korea and a host country f (US$)
GDPPC Diff Sqhft: Square of difference in real GDP per capita between Korea and a host country f
GDPPC Diffhft ×HC Diffhft: Product of difference in real GDP per capita and difference in index of human
capital
εhft: Error term
The dependent variable, ROFDI, is defined as annual real FDI flows from Korea to a host
country. The first explanatory variable, ROFDIhft−1, represents a lagged value of the endogenous
dependent variable. It captures that when MNEs have invested more in a country in the past
year, they tend to invest more in the country in the present year, i.e. so-called self-reinforcing
effect, learning-by-doing effect, or agglomeration effect (Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; and Wheeler and
Mody, 1992) and the coefficient β1 is expected to be positive. The second explanatory variable,
Sum GDP , represents the sum of two countries’ market size (i.e. the sum of Korean real GDP
and host country’s real GDP). The coefficient β2 should be positive as a larger joint market size
is expected to increase FDI. The standard KC theory predicts that the similarity in market size is
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also an important motivation for horizontal FDI and therefore β3 should be negative in principle.
However, the coefficient on market size similarity can be positive as one partner, here Korea, is not
sufficiently large in size. In such cases, it is difficult to discriminate theoretically between horizontal
and vertical motivations (Chellaraj et al., 2013).
In the paper, HC Diff is the difference in the index of human capital between Korea and
a host country. Korea is relatively skilled-labor-abundant compared with host countries in most
cases of my sample, and it thus has a higher value of human capital index than most host coun-
tries (see Table B.1 in Appendix B).5 The difference becomes larger as the host country is more
human-capital-abundant. The standard KC theory suggests that horizontal FDI more likely occurs
when two countries are similar in this relative factor endowments, but vertical FDI is more likely
encouraged as Korean MNEs have more opportunity to reduce production costs when a difference
in the relative factor endowments rises. Thus, the expected sign for β4 becomes ambiguous. If
the HC Diff variable mainly captures horizontal motivation for FDI, β4 should be negative. On
the other hand, if Korean FDI largely depends on vertical motivation, β4 would be positive. The
fifth term is the product of GDP Diff and HC Diff . Awokuse et al. (2012) explain that this
variable is included to capture that given a market size difference, larger difference in skilled-labor
endowment would decline horizontal FDI relative to increased vertical FDI. Therefore, the expected
sign for β5 is also ambiguous for Korean FDI.
The sixth variable is IB (Investment barriers), indicating perceived impediments of investing
in a host country. As any investment impediments are expected to lower all types of FDI, β6 should
be negative. The next two variables are related to trade costs. Higher trade costs in Korea (parent
country) discourage vertical FDI because higher costs make importing of the final products back
to Korea more costly. Thus, β7 is expected to be negative. On the other hand, higher trade costs
in a host country foster horizontal FDI because MNEs should prefer affiliate production to costly
export. Thus, β8 is expected to be positive. The variable HC Diff Sq × TC is an interaction
5In the Table B.1 of Appendix B presenting basic statistics of variables, it can be identified that Korea is a
human-capital-abundant country.
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term between squared human capital differences and trade costs in a host country. As mentioned
just before, a higher level of trade costs that Korean firms have to pay when exporting to the host
country extends incentives for horizontal FDI, and the incentives for horizontal FDI expand when
a difference in human capital is smaller. Thus, this variable captures the idea that given a level of
trade costs in the host country, the effects of the trade costs on horizontal FDI rely on a difference
in human capital. In other words, the direct positive effects of the trade costs on horizontal FDI
decrease as a difference in human capital grows. The coefficient β9 is therefore expected to be
negative.
The next explanatory variable, Sum GDPPC, represents the sum of Korean real GDP per
capita and host country’s real GDP per capita. The coefficient β10 should be positive as a theoretical
result of this paper (Figure 2.6 (A)) clearly shows that the larger world aggregate demand due to
a growth of individual income is, the more horizontal mutinational’s activities are. The findings
on the Linder effect lie at the center of this paper. Theoretical results on asymmetric per-capita
income between the two countries commonly highlights the Linder effect that is also an important
motivation for horizontal FDI (i.e. the similarity in per-capita income raises horizontal FDI) and
therefore β11 should be negative. The final term in equation (3.1) is the product of GDPPC Diff
and HC Diff . It is well known that horizontal FDI is more active among developed countries
and vertical FDI is more brisk between developed and developing countries. Between Korea and
a developed country, values of both variables, GDPPC Diff and HC Diff , are small, but they
would have a large positive figure between Korea and a developing country. The sign of β12 thus
depends on a FDI motivation that the interaction variable captures. Most studies to estimate
the KC model include geographical distance in the regression equation. In this paper, however, I
exclude this time-invariant variable due to the use of a GMM estimation approach.
Alternatively, one may regard that the effects of market size variables in the previous empirical
KC model, by the definition of GDP, can be decomposed into those of variables of two fundamental
factors, per-capita income and neutral factor. In theoretical considerations of the chapter 2, it
is analyzed that when comparing between the effects of these two variables on aggregate demand
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in a country, their roles are qualitatively similar, but per-capita income plays a leading role in
determining aggregate demand in a country.6 Thus, the theoretical results conjecture that the
similarity in per-capita income level encourages horizontal FDI regardless of controlling for variables
of neutral factor, measured by the number of population. Accordingly, I estimate an alternative
specification, which adds population variables to the equation (3.1) instead of excluding GDP
variables.
To check whether the main results driven from the specification (3.1) are robust, another
examination is to identify whether the inclusion of FDI-related determinants, such as infrastructure
and institution, changes the Linder effect of my central interest. In addition, this paper also
considers an inquiry of whether the Linder effect holds for FDI experiences of the other country,
the U.S., different from Korea.
3.3.2 Estimation Approach
3.3.2.1 Econometric Issues
Empirical analysis of this paper has the following characteristics. First, the dependent vari-
able ROFDI is dynamic in nature (Awokuse et al., 2012). In this case, its lagged variable as a
explanatory variable is in general included. Second, it is pre-determined, but it is not completely
exogenous, so that its instrument variable is essential to estimation. Third, I need to control for
some fixed effects that can be present across host countries. Fourth, an estimation approach using
instrument variables is also appropriate because some of independent variables can have endogeneity
problem including reverse causality. Fifth, I should consider heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
for the error term. Finally, the number of time series is small, but the number of analyzed host
countries is large.
For the reasons with availability of panel data, the empirical analysis of this paper can use a
GMM estimator. An estimator of System GMM in general shows a good performance in terms of
bias and precision than that of Differenece GMM because the former uses additional instruments.
6This point is also found in previous papers such as Markusen (2013) and Fieler (2011).
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I will again discuss this point shortly. Therefore, many applied studies with dynamic panel settings
use it (e.g. Carkovic and Levine, 2005).
A GMM approach is a method in which it basically finds estimated parameters that minimize
a weighted objective function. While an one-step estimator produces the estimated parameters
using an initial weight matrix, a two-step estimator implements an additional procedure where the
estimated results driven from the one-step process are used to minimize the weighted objective
function again. It is well known that the two-step estimator is superior in terms of asymptotical
properties to the one-step estimator (Min and Choi, 2009). Therefore, the two-step estimator
of System GMM with robust errors considered for heteroscedasticity is employed to yield main
estimation results.
3.3.2.2 Detailed Discussion on System GMM Estimator
Consider the following estimating equation:
FDIjt − FDIjt−1 = (α− 1)FDIjt−1 + β′Xjt + εjt
⇔ FDIjt = αFDIjt−1 + β′Xjt + εjt,
(3.2)
where FDI is my FDI measure as the dependent variable, X is the set of independent variables
other than the lagged FDI, ε is an error term (before difference process), and subscript j and t are
(host) country and year, respectively. I assume that the error term ε consists of the unobserved
country-specific effects υ and the pure error term u.
By first-differencing, the unobserved country-specific fixed effects υ is removed.
FDIjt − FDIjt−1 = α(FDIjt−1 − FDIjt−2) + β′(Xjt −Xjt−1) + (εjt − εjt−1)
⇔ ∆FDIjt = α∆FDIjt−1 + β′∆Xjt + ∆εjt, and ∆εjt = (υj − υj) + (ujt − ujt−1) = ∆ujt.
(3.3)
Two types of endogeneity are required to be controlled for. First, some FDI determinants
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may be endogenously determined with FDI. To control for this type of endogeneity, their lagged
levels can be used as instruments. This makes the endogenous variables pre-determined, and thus
they are not correlated with the error term ∆εjt. Second, the error term ∆εjt after differencing may
be correlated with ∆FDIjt−1, the lagged variable of dependent variable as a regressor. To avoid
this endogeneity problem, ∆FDIjt−1 is also instrumented with its past levels. If I assume that the
error term εjt before differencing is serially uncorrelated, and that independent variables are not
correlated with future values of the error term, a GMM estimator for dynamic panel employs two
moment conditions as follows.
E [FDIjt−k ·∆εjt] = 0, for t = 3, · · · , T and k ≥ 2. (3.4)
E [Xjt−k ·∆εjt] = 0, for t = 3, · · · , T and k ≥ 2. (3.5)
This estimator based on the moment conditions is generally referred to as Difference GMM esti-
mator.
However, it is documented that this difference estimator may have statistical weaknesses.
When independent variables are persistent over time, the used instruments can become weak pre-
dictors for the endogenous variables (Blundell and Bond, 1998). These weak instruments not only
can lead to biased coefficients in small sample, but they can also asymptotically cause an increase
in the variance of the estimated coefficients.
To avoid the biases and imprecision with the difference estimator, Blundell and Bond (1998)
suggest that additional moment conditions are available. If I adopt an assumption on a stationarity
of the initial observation, the lagged differences of the endogenous variables can be used as extra
instruments. Thus, the following additional moment conditions are:
E [(FDIjt−k − FDIjt−k−1) · εjt] = E [(FDIjt−k − FDIjt−k−1) · (υj + ujt)] = 0, for k = 1 (3.6)
E [(Xjt−k −Xjt−k−1) · εjt] = E [(Xjt−k −Xjt−k−1) · (υj + ujt)] = 0, for k = 1. (3.7)
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This estimator based on the moment conditions (3.4) - (3.7) is referred to as System GMM estima-
tor. In this paper, I use this System GMM estimator for the dynamic panel to produce unbiased
and efficient estimates.
The consistency of the System GMM estimator relies on the validity of the used instruments.
To examine the validity of the used instruments, I conduct a Hansen test of overidentifying con-
ditions. Note that when heteroscedasticity is considered through robust error, Hansen statistics
instead of Sargan statistics are used for testing overidentifying restrictions (Min and Choi, 2009).
Furthermore, the number of the used instruments should be equal to or less than than the number
of countries. If it is greater than the number of countries, the analysis can have a problem for the
reliability issue of the above test of overidentifying restrictions.
Another test is associated with the assumption of no serial correlation of the error term
εhft (before difference process). By Arellano-Bond statistics, I assess whether the error term εhft
is serially correlated. Note that if the error term εhft (before difference process) is not serially
correlated, then there may exist a first-order serial correlation in the differenced error term, but
the differenced error term should not present a second-order serial correlation (Awokuse et al.,
2012). All tests and considerations conducted in this paper support that the analysis is statistically
significant. I do not address this issue hereafter again.
3.3.3 Data
My analytical sample is a balanced panel data of 57 countries over the period 1999-2010.7
Data on the dependent variable are annual data of Korean outward FDI flows and are from the
Export-Import Bank of Korea. These raw data represent a nominal measure and are reported in
thousands of U.S. dollars. The data were converted to a real measure in millions of 2005 dollars
7The list of 57 host countries includes 13 Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam), 2 North American countries (Canada
and United States), 26 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom), and 16 other countries (10 Other
American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru),
2 Oceanian countries (Australia and New Zealand), 2 Middle-east Asian countries (Israel and Jordan), and 2 African
countries (Egypt and South Africa)).
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using a deflator from the World Bank.
Data on real GDP, population, and human capital used in constructing several variables are
from Penn World Table 8.0 database. According to the definition, GDP per capita is calculated by
dividing real GDP by the number of population. Annual real GDP and population are measured in
millions of 2005 U.S. dollars and in millions of people, respectively, and thus real GDP per capita
used is measured in one 2005 U.S. dollar. As a proxy for skill endowments, this paper uses an
index of human capital indicating the amount of human capital per worker. The index is created
based on information on both the average years of schooling from Barro-Lee (2012) and the return
to education from Psacharopoulos (1994). A number of studies estimating the KC model have
used occupation data from International Labour Organization (ILO) to measure relative skilled-
labor endowments. ILO data have shortcomings in that they are available for considerably limited
countries and years.
Data on trade costs and investment barriers are taken from the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) database of the Fraser Institute. As a proxy for trade costs, the index of regulatory
trade barriers is employed. In the case of investment impediments, I use the index labeled as foreign
ownership/investment restrictions. As both indexes have published for every 5 year before 2000,
linear interpolation is conducted to obtain data in 1999. Both indexes commonly range from zero
to 10, with 10 indicating the least trade costs and the lowest investment barriers, respectively. To
construct my measures from these two indexes, I use the formula: (10 − index) × 10. Thus, my
measures commonly have a zero-to-100 scale and indicate that a higher value means a larger trade
costs and a higher investment barriers.8
3.4 Empirical Results
I first estimate the equation (3.1) of the main specification with confirming the standard
empirical KC model as a preliminary analysis (Table 3.3). I then run additional regressions for
relevant specifications to check the robustness of the main results. For each specification, estimation
8See Appendix A.3 for summary statistics and correlation matrix on main estimation analysis.
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results by the one-step estimator of the System GMM approach are included.9
3.4.1 Main Estimation Results
Table 3.3 shows estimation results by the System GMM both for the standard empirical KC
model (Columns (1) and (2)) and for the main specification in this paper (Columns (3) and (4)).
In Columns (1) and (2), I confirm the standard KC theory for Korean overseas direct investment
as almost all estimated coefficients have their expected signs.
The Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.3 fall under the main empirical results for which the
standard empirical KC model is re-estimated with per-capita income variables to examine the Linder
effect predicted theoretically. Most coeffecients show that it is likely that the results are consistent
with the predictions from the KC theory. One-year-lagged endogenous variable (L.ROFDI) shows
that its coeffecients are always positive and statistically significant. Past activities by Korean
multinationals have a siginificant positive impact on current (and future) FDI. Human capital
difference variable also shows significant positive coefficients, implying a vertical motive. The
interaction variable between human capital difference and market size difference has a significantly
negative impact, consistent with empirical results of previous studies such as Awokuse et al. (2012)
and Chellaraj et al. (2013). The coefficients on investment barriers are always negative, as expected,
but insignificant.
The next three variables after GDP Diff ×HC Diff present more reinforced significance
with no change from the expected signs in Columns (3) and (4), relative to Columns (1) and (2).
Trade costs for Korea are clearly associated with the vertical FDI. As the effect of Korea’s trade
costs is significantly negative, I again confirm vertical motivations that Korean investors have had.
The coefficient on trade costs for host countries is significantly positive, but the coefficient on
the interaction term between squared human capital difference and trade costs for host countries
is significantly negative. These results imply that higher trade costs in host countries extend
9As mentioned earlier, the one-step estimator is less efficient than the two-step estimator, but it is turned out
that there are no significant differences in results between the two estimators. I therefore discuss the results through
two-step estimator only.
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Table 3.3: Main System GMM regression Results
Dependent Variable: ROFDI
Standard KC model Main (extended) model
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign (1) One-step (2) Two-step (3) One-step (4) Two-step
L.ROFDI + 0.747∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗ 0.586∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗
(0.0839) (0.0838) (0.107) (0.107)
Sum GDP + 5.50e− 05∗ 5.50e− 05∗ -6.33e-06 -7.89e-06
(3.06e-05) (3.06e-05) (3.95e-05) (3.78e-05)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 3.08e-12 3.08e-12 1.26e− 11∗∗∗ 1.27e− 11∗∗∗
(3.41e-12) (3.41e-12) (4.36e-12) (4.36e-12)
HC Diff - / + 164.2∗∗ 165.9∗∗ 210.2∗∗∗ 203.4∗∗∗
(83.54) (82.37) (77.04) (77.87)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + -2.71e-05 -2.69e-05 −1.03e− 04∗∗∗ −1.05e− 04∗∗∗
(2.93e-05) (2.93e-05) (3.58e-05) (3.67e-05)
Host Investment Barriers - -2.993 -3.001 -3.863 -3.775
(2.144) (2.150) (2.403) (2.391)
Home Trade Costs - -2.273 -2.287 −10.78∗∗∗ −10.66∗∗∗
(1.492) (1.497) (3.177) (3.167)
Host Trade Costs + 2.333 2.327 4.959∗ 4.874∗
(2.254) (2.325) (2.724) (2.756)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −3.417∗ −3.389∗ −5.704∗∗∗ −5.524∗∗
(1.760) (1.800) (2.165) (2.161)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00733∗∗∗ 0.00730∗∗∗
(0.00218) (0.00219)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −1.10e− 07∗ −1.06e− 07∗
(6.37e-08) (6.11e-08)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00974∗∗ 0.00963∗
(0.00485) (0.00508)
Number of Observations 529 529 529 529
Number of Countries 57 57 57 57
Number of Instrument Variables 53 53 49 49
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.92 -1.90 -2.18 -1.85
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.18 -0.18 -0.13 -0.12
Hansen Statistics 49.06 49.06 48.95 48.95
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
horizontal incentives, but the horizontal incentives shrink as a difference in human capital grows
(i.e. vertical incentives are larger).
The results for the impacts of both GDP and GDP per capita variables are of central interest
in the paper. First, the two per-capita income variables, Sum GDPPC and GDPPC Diff Sq,
have the significant expected influences on Korean overseas investment. A rise in the sum of two
countries’ per-capita incomes exerts significant positive effects on Korean investors. More impor-
tantly, a larger divergence in individual income levels between Korea and host countries discourages
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Korean overseas investment. This central result of this paper implies that the Linder hypothesis
holds for FDI. It also supports that Korean investors have much horizontal (market-seeking) incen-
tives. The last variable, GDPPC Diff ×HC Diff , has significant positive coefficient, indicating
a vertical motivation. Second, there are large changes in both sign and significance for the coeffi-
cients on Sum GDP and GDP Diff Sq between the two specifications. For the specification of
the standard KC model (Column (1) and (2)), the coefficients on both variables seem to be con-
sistent with the predictions from the KC theory, although the coefficients on GDP Diff Sq are
insignificantly positive. However, they show surprising results clearly inconsistent with the basic
KC theory for the extended specification. This implies that a growth and a similarity of market size
(or total income) are unlikely to have stable effects on FDI. On the other hand, the influences on
the per-capita income growth and similarity variables are likely stable across different specifications
as shown in Table 3.5 and 3.6 shortly.
Overall, most variables in the extended empirical model strongly influence Korean overseas
investment, as expected. In particular, I find that the Linder hypothesis for Korean outward FDI
holds at highly aggregate level.
To investigate economic significance of the estimated Linder effect, I consider the following
partial derivative of Korean outward FDI with respect to per-capita GDP difference in the equation
(3.1):
∂ROFDI
∂GDPPC Diff
= 2× β3 ×GDPPC Diff + β5 ×HC Diff. (3.8)
The total impact of individual income divergences is determined by two terms. The first term
captures that FDI activities are greatest when the countries are similar in individual income level.
By the second term, on the other hand, human capital differences also affect the effect of individual
income divergences as the theory suggests. Here, in order to facilitate interpretation of economic
significance, I compute implied elasticity at the sample average of relevant variables. The elasticity
computed from the main results (Column (4) of Table 3.3) indicates that a 10% decrease in per-
capita income divergences leads to a 8.6% rise in Korean overseas direct investment. In other
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words, if per-capita income divergences between Korea and host country shrink by US$330, the
host country attracts, on average, more direct investment from Korea by US$22 million.
One may question whether the existence of the Linder effect varies according to per-capita
income levels of host countries. For investigation, I divide the sample used to produce Table 3.3 into
the two subsamples, develpoed-country subsample and developing-country subsample, by whether
the per-capita income level of each host country is greater than that of Korea. Then, I estimate
the regression equation (3.1) for each of these two subsamples.
Table 3.4: System GMM Regression Results for Two Subsamples by Per-capita Income Level
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Entire Countries Developed Countries Developing Countries
L.ROFDI + 0.585∗∗∗ 0.535∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.105) (0.0828)
Sum GDP + -7.89e-06 -7.58e-05 2.05e-04
(3.78e-05) (5.70e-05) (1.45e-04)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 1.27e− 11∗∗∗ 3.33e− 11∗∗∗ 3.50e-12
(4.36e-12) (1.20e-11) (1.05e-11)
HC Diff - / + 203.4∗∗∗ 692.8∗∗ 31.79
(77.87) (311.2) (238.8)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + −1.05e− 04∗∗∗ −5.22e− 04∗∗ -9.01e-05
(3.67e-05) (2.14e-04) (9.28e-05)
Host Investment Barriers - -3.775 -3.492 -5.670
(2.391) (4.276) (3.724)
Home Trade Costs - −10.66∗∗∗ −17.97∗ -6.326
(3.167) (9.800) (4.317)
Host Trade Costs + 4.874∗ 1.226 -2.046
(2.756) (7.319) (2.112)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −5.524∗∗ −71.49∗∗ 4.025
(2.161) (34.00) (3.482)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00730∗∗∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.00150
(0.00219) (0.00593) (0.00521)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −1.06e− 07∗ −3.18e− 07∗ 9.27e-07
(6.11e-08) (1.80e-07) (7.81e-07)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00963∗ 0.000878 -0.0252
(0.00508) (0.0247) (0.0260)
Number of Observations 529 213 269
Number of Countries 57 26 30
Number of Instrument Variables 49 25 29
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.85 -1.67 -1.13
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.12 -1.22 0.36
Hansen Statistics 48.95 20.03 27.35
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Column (2) of Table 3.4 displays the estimation results for the develpoed-country subsample
where host countries have a higher per-capita income level than Korea, and Column (1) for the
developing-country subsample. These two columns shows quite large differences in sign and signif-
icance of coefficients. Overall, the results for the develpoed-country subsample are similar to those
for the previous integrated sample (Column (1)), while the results for the developing-country sub-
sample are not. Blonigen and Wang (2004) argue that the effect of each underlying factor on FDI
to developing countries is considerably different from that on FDI to developed countries. Here, it
is also found that consideration on the issue pointed out by Blonigen and Wang (2004) matter for
relevant studies.
3.4.2 Robustness Checks
The main results of Table 3.3 are strengthened by additional regressions in Table 3.5 and 3.6,
which consider three alternative specifications. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.5, I estimate an
equation in which GDP variables are excluded from the main specification of the equation (3.1).10
Further, the effects of GDP variables in the standard KC specification may be decomposed to those
of two variables, GDP per-capita and population, according to the definition of GDP. Columns (3)
and (4) of Table 3.5 show the results for the estimating equation reflecting this idea.
When I compare the results in all columns of Table 3.5 with those in Columns (3) and (4)
of Table 3.3, the influences of GDPPC variables on Korean overseas investment barely change in
both the statistical significance and the expected signs, as predicted. I again confirm that the key
hypothesis is reasonable i.e. FDI is likely to be greater between countries similar in individual
income levels. The comparison implies that the Linder effect for FDI is important regardless of
controlling for either total income variables or population variables. The other variables commonly
show that their coefficients all still keep their expected signs but for some of them statistical
significance varies across specifications. In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3.5, a rise in Sum POP
10This equation can be regarded as GDP per capita variables replace GDP variables in the standard KC specification
because per-capita income plays a leading role. Therefore, I refer to this specification as replaced model.
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Table 3.5: System GMM regression Results for No Controlling for GDP Variables and for Control-
ling for Population Variables
Dependent Variable: ROFDI
Replaced model Decomposed model
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign (1) One-step (2) Two-step (3) One-step (4) Two-step
L.ROFDI + 0.864∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0485) (0.0484)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00735∗∗∗ 0.00736∗∗∗ 0.00730∗∗∗ 0.00729∗∗∗
(0.00221) (0.00222) (0.00238) (0.00236)
GDPPC Diff Sq - / + −6.30e− 08∗ −6.58e− 08∗ −8.24e− 08∗ −9.23e− 08∗
(3.57e-08) (3.43e-08) (4.21e-08) (3.62e-08)
HC Diff - / + 56.12 56.04 12.83 15.96
(107.1) (107.7) (60.00) (66.46)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.0115∗∗∗ 0.0117∗∗∗
(0.00563) (0.00565) (0.00415) (0.00425)
Host Investment Barriers - −4.402∗∗ −4.402∗∗ −5.155∗ −5.162∗
(2.043) (2.042) (2.632) (2.649)
Home Trade Costs - −9.964∗∗∗ −9.960∗∗∗ −12.24∗∗∗ −12.24∗∗∗
(3.172) (3.163) (4.361) (4.512)
Host Trade Costs + 4.100∗ 4.091∗ 2.144 2.162
(2.234) (2.232) (2.940) (3.055)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −5.452∗∗ −5.435∗∗ -2.909 -2.991
(2.442) (2.461) (1.782) (2.084)
Sum POP + 1.773∗∗∗ 1.779∗∗∗
(0.364) (0.376)
POP Diff Sq - 3.75e-05 3.06e-05
(0.000270) (0.000279)
POP Diff × HC Diff - / + 1.300∗∗∗ 1.300∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.158)
Number of Observations 529 529 529 529
Number of Countries 57 57 57 57
Number of Instrument Variables 56 56 48 48
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -2.03 -1.94 -1.95 -1.92
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.17 -0.17 -0.18 -0.16
Hansen Statistics 52.44 52.44 50.27 50.82
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
or POP Diff ×HC Diff increases Korean outward FDI.
Another specification examination is to check the significant presence of changes in the re-
sults of interest by adding two FDI-related factors, infrastructure and institution, into the main
estimating equation. Table 3.6 allows for a comparison of the estimation results from between
the alternative specification and the main specification. Overall, it shows that the sign and the
significance for coefficient estimates of interest are preserved.
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Table 3.6: System GMM Regression Results, Controlling for Infrastructure and Institution
Dependent Variable: ROFDI
Main model Model with
infrastructure and institution
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign (1) One-step (2) Two-step (3) One-step (4) Two-step
L.ROFDI + 0.586∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.775∗∗∗ 0.763∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.327) (0.324)
Sum GDP + -6.33e-06 -7.89e-06 −2.99e− 04∗∗ −3.08e− 04∗∗∗
(3.95e-05) (3.78e-05) (1.18e-04) (1.14e-04)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 1.26e− 11∗∗∗ 1.27e− 11∗∗∗ 3.50e− 11∗∗∗ 3.72e− 11∗∗∗
(4.36e-12) (4.36e-12) (1.14e-11) (1.21e-11)
HC Diff - / + 210.2∗∗∗ 203.4∗∗∗ 402.8∗∗ 395.1∗
(77.04) (77.87) (194.9) (229.4)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + −1.03e− 04∗∗∗ −1.05e− 04∗∗∗ −2.93e− 04∗∗∗ −3.06e− 04∗∗∗
(3.58e-05) (3.67e-05) (1.11e-04) (1.13e-04)
Host Investment Barriers - -3.863 -3.775 −11.56∗∗ −10.86∗∗
(2.403) (2.391) (4.273) (4.439)
Home Trade Costs - −10.78∗∗∗ −10.66∗∗∗ 10.23 11.49
(3.177) (3.167) (8.456) (8.204)
Host Trade Costs + 4.959∗ 4.874∗ 5.254 4.144
(2.724) (2.756) (3.628) (3.661)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −5.704∗∗∗ −5.524∗∗ −20.46∗∗ −19.26∗∗
(2.165) (2.161) (8.974) (9.556)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00733∗∗∗ 0.00730∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗ 0.0695∗∗∗
(0.00218) (0.00219) (0.0264) (0.0245)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −1.10e− 07∗ −1.06e− 07∗ −1.77e− 06∗∗ −1.71e− 06∗
(6.37e-08) (6.11e-08) (8.46e-07) (9.57e-07)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00974∗∗ 0.00963∗ 0.0683∗∗ 0.0640∗∗
(0.00485) (0.00508) (0.0269) (0.0251)
Infrastructure 2.312 0.189
(3.471) (3.497)
Institution −43.76∗∗ −38.58∗∗∗
(17.16) (14.72)
Number of Observations 529 529 340 340
Number of Countries 57 57 47 47
Number of Instrument Variables 53 53 37 37
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.92 -1.90 -2.07 -1.69
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.18 -0.18 -0.15 -0.21
Hansen Statistics 49.06 49.06 24.65 24.65
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The last investigation in the chapter is look at whether the Linder effect holds for an analysis
using the U.S. data. Before the discussion on the regression results, it should be noted that there
are differences in used data as home countries are different (Korea vs the U.S.). First, while so
far FDI flows data in Korean FDI estimations are used due to data availability, affiliate sales data
are employed for the U.S. Second, while human capital data as a proxy for labor endowments are
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used for Korea, skilled labor endowments are employed for the U.S. Finally, the period analyzed
for Korea is 1999-2010 while years for the U.S. analysis are 1997-2008.
Column (3) and (4) of Table 3.7 are the results for the U.S. and Column (1) and (2) are
identical to main results of Column (3) and (4) of Table 3.3. Due to the differences in used data,
the sizes of estimated coefficients are different between home countries. However, the sign and the
significance do not vary between home countries.
Table 3.7: System GMM Regression Results for U.S. Affiliate Sales
Dependent Variable: ROFDI
Model for Korean FDI Model for US Affiliate Sales
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign (1) One-step (2) Two-step (3) One-step (4) Two-step
L.ROFDI + 0.586∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 1.138∗∗∗ 1.139∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.107) (0.0161) (0.0163)
Sum GDP + -6.33e-06 -7.89e-06 -0.0183 -0.0265
(3.95e-05) (3.78e-05) (0.0985) (0.101)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 1.26e− 11∗∗∗ 1.99e− 08∗∗∗ 1.99e− 08∗∗∗ 3.72e− 11∗∗∗
(4.36e-12) (4.36e-12) (4.82e-09) (4.88e-09)
HC Diff - / + 210.2∗∗∗ 203.4∗∗∗ 1.511e+ 07∗∗ 1.565e+ 07∗∗
(77.04) (77.87) (6.055e+06) (6.102e+06)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + −1.03e− 04∗∗∗ −1.05e− 04∗∗∗ −1.767∗∗∗ −1.791∗∗∗
(3.58e-05) (3.67e-05) (0.532) (0.528)
Host Investment Barriers - -3.863 -3.775 3,994 3,799
(2.403) (2.391) (4,197) (4,250)
Home Trade Costs - −10.78∗∗∗ −10.66∗∗∗ −74, 965∗∗∗ −71, 598∗∗∗
(3.177) (3.167) (23,359) (23,662)
Host Trade Costs + 4.959∗ 4.874∗ 14, 455∗∗ 14, 230∗∗
(2.724) (2.756) (6,585) (7,243)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −5.704∗∗∗ −5.524∗∗ −430, 366∗∗∗ −423, 298∗∗∗
(2.165) (2.161) (140,444) (161,148)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00733∗∗∗ 0.00730∗∗∗ -19.41 -18.65
(0.00218) (0.00219) (12.80) (13.33)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −1.10e− 07∗ −1.06e− 07∗ −9.19e− 04∗ −8.81e− 04∗
(6.37e-08) (6.11e-08) (4.74e-04) (5.00e-04)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00974∗∗ 0.00963∗ 282.5∗∗∗ 268.2∗∗∗
(0.00485) (0.00508) (84.37) (88.71)
Number of Observations 529 529 432 432
Number of Countries 57 57 46 46
Number of Instrument Variables 53 53 44 44
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.92 -1.90 -2.19 -2.24
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.18 -0.18 -1.31 -1.29
Hansen Statistics 49.06 49.06 41.31 41.31
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Taken as a whole, I confirm that empirical evidence from this chapter is likely consistent
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with the predictions from the chapter 2. Moreover, the main estimation results are robust across
different specifications of empirical model and for the U.S. data.
3.5 Summary and Concluding Remark
A conventional wisdom on FDI is that the majority of World FDI flows has been concentrated
to developed countries. As the countries are likely to have a high per-capita income level indicating
large demands for goods and services, the relation between per-capita income and FDI is open to
academic research. By this motivation the chapter 2 and this chapter commonly looked at the
impacts of demand-side factors on aggregate demands and therefore MNEs’ overseas investment
decisions.
In the framework of the chapter 2, theoretical foundation on the link between per-capita in-
come and horizontal FDI are formally established by combining a simple nonhomothetic preferences
to the existing horizontal MNE model underlying the standard KC theory. The chapter 2 suggests
that the Linder effect exists for FDI, independent of roles of market size and neutral factor.
The paper empirically investigated testable hypotheses involving the Linder effect for FDI
of central interest. Korean overseas investment experiences for 57 host countries over the period
after the financial crisis were applied to the empirical KC model extended and motivated by the
theoretical predictions of the chapter 2 for horizontal FDI. Similarity in per-capita income level
was important for Korean investors, implying that the Linder hypothesis holds for FDI at highly
aggregated level. Specifically, a 10% decrease in per-capita income divergences between Korea and
an average host country leads to a 8.6% rise in Korean overseas direct investment. There was no
change in the main results both across different specifications and for the U.S. FDI experiences.
This paper can be extended in at least two directions. First, there is a need to identify whether
the Linder hypothesis holds for sectoral, industrial or firm level. Second, another implication from
nonhomothetic preferences is that aggregate demand also depends on income distribution (or income
inequality). In the paper, I exclude this topic by adding a related assumption. To my knowledge,
the FDI papers have not focused on the issue.
Chapter 4
SECTORAL DIFFERENCES IN FDI DETERMINANTS: A
KNOWLEDGE-CAPITAL APPROACH
4.1 Introduction
A remarkable feature of global economy is that services sector and services foreign direct
investment (FDI) are on the rise. The share of GDP in services sector has globally grown: 57%
in 1980, 62% in 1990, 68% in 2000, and 71% in 2010.1 In particular, sharp shifts towards services
sector in terms of the sectoral (manufacturing versus services) share of world inward FDI stock are
also detected: 41% vs 49% in 1990, 34% vs 60% in 2002, and 25% vs 64% in 2011.2 So far, on the
other hand, research on FDI determinants has mainly focused on aggregate FDI and manufacturing
FDI (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2010). Given an expansion of the services sectors importance in terms
of both GDP and FDI, a study comparing FDI determinants in manufacturing and services sectors
holds important policy implications.
This paper analyzes sectoral differences in FDI determinants. Based on the knowledge-capital
(KC) framework and its extended version focusing on demand, it examines the determinants for
sectoral FDI and compares their influences in the manufacturing and services sectors. As the
fundamental motivations for multinational enterprises (MNEs) to launch upon a foreign affiliate
are largely similar across sectors, a basic theory of FDI in aggregate level and manufacturing sector,
including the KC model, could be applied to account for FDI in services (Dunning and McQueen,
1The raw numbers are abstracted from the World Development Indicator (WDI) of the World Bank.
2The sectoral shares in the years are obtained from the World Investment Report (various years) of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).
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1982; Ramasamy and Yeung, 2010; and Nefussi and Schwellnus, 2010). Using Korean MNEs
experiences after 1997-1998 financial crisis, this paper displays that national characteristics the KC
models consider commonly drive FDI in each sector but differences in their influences depend on
distinct features of sectors.
The paper contributes to the literature on FDI determinants in several ways. First, it consid-
ers parent-country-specific characteristics. The basic approach of this paper, the KC model, enables
me to include parent-country-specific characteristics as a part of several variables. Most previous
literature explaining the location decision of MNEs in services has ignored parent-country-specific
characteristics. Recently, the standard KC model has been extended by the chapter 2 and 3, which
uncover that the similarity of per-capita income between parent and host countries matters for hor-
izontal FDI, so-called Linder effect for FDI, by introducing non-homotheticity into the demand-side
of horizontal FDI model. The paper proposes main results through the augmented KC model.
Second, the paper examines the hypothesis that the degree of importance of each FDI de-
terminant varies between manufacturing and services sectors. More specifically, I concentrate on
the following concerns: (1) are services FDI more demand-seeking than manufacturing FDI? (2)
are trade impediments important for manufacturing FDI only? (3) are manufacturing FDI and
producer service FDI complementary? To derive more convincing conclusions on these concerns,
I perform a comparison of relative importance of determinants between the two sectors through
standardized coefficients.
The main findings from this analysis can be summarized as follows. First, services FDI is
likely to be more demand-seeking than manufacturing FDI. Second, services FDI does not tend
to be influenced by trade impediments. These two arguments arise because some services are
non-tradable, implying that a facility providing the services should be located in the region where
they are consumed. The results are consistent with previous studies on FDI in services such as
Kolstad and Villanger (2008). Third, while producer services, which include finance, business, and
transport industries, are expected to play a role of intermediate goods in manufacturing processes,
I do not confirm a complementary relationship between manufacturing and producer service FDI,
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conflicting with Kolstad and Villanger (2008) and Ramasamy and Yeung (2010).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes some stylized facts
on recent patterns and trends for Korean outward FDI. Section 4.3 briefly reviews the KC theory
and discusses some issues when one analyzes FDI determinants for services sector. In Section 4.4,
I present the empirical model, describe used data, discuss estimation methodology, and report the
principal empirical results. Finally, the paper ends with summary in Section 4.5.
4.2 Some Stylized Facts
Today the services sector is the most growing sector for FDI worldwide. This trend is also
true for Korea. Figure 4.1 shows the sectoral trends of Korean outward FDI over time. It shows
that FDI in manufacturing and services have similar trends up to 2006 while there appears a marked
difference in terms of sectoral share of total FDI after 2006. Given that services FDI is increasingly
important in recent years, understanding its determinants is essential to successful policies for FDI.
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (http://www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp)
Figure 4.1: Sectoral Trends of Korean Outward FDI
Table 4.1 illustrates the distribution of cumulative Korean outward FDI between manufac-
turing and services sectors for selected twenty host countries. It clearly shows that Korean multi-
nationals have been interested in services sector in developed countries while they have relatively
focused on manufacturing sector in less developed countries. For developed countries, the ratio of
manufacturing FDI over services FDI is likely less than one, while it is much greater than one for
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most developing countries.
Table 4.1: Sectoral Distribution of Korean Outward Cumulative FDI for Selected Countries
Countries Total FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI Manufacturing FDI/Services FDI
(Millions of dollars)
United States 46,771 11,365 27,472 0.41
China 45,165 35,721 9,054 3.95
Hong Kong 15,194 2,488 12,628 0.20
Vietnam 9,559 5,309 2,519 2.11
United Kingdom 9,415 982 4,064 0.24
Netherlands 9,057 2,215 4,683 0.47
Australia 8,206 223 1,495 0.15
Canada 7,578 643 1,046 0.62
Indonesia 7,212 3,879 1,219 3.18
Brazil 5,353 2,734 901 3.03
Singapore 5,183 1,593 3,412 0.47
Japan 4,728 770 3,957 0.19
Malaysia 4,497 2,148 770 2.79
Germany 4,008 2,074 1,934 1.07
India 3,253 2,793 455 6.14
Philippines 3,095 2,329 741 3.14
Ireland 2,384 704 1,680 0.42
Mexico 2,351 933 487 1.92
Panama 2,132 62 2,021 0.03
Russia 2,073 1,143 613 1.86
Source: Export-Import Bank of Korea (http;//www.koreaexim.go.kr/kr/work/check/oversea/use.jsp)
4.3 KC Theory and Some Issues on an Analysis on Services FDI
4.3.1 Knowledge-Capital Model
The knowledge-capital theory of the multinational enterprises by Markusen (2002) and Carr
et al. (2001) provides basic theoretical foundations in this study. I briefly review the model in this
section.
The model makes three fundamental assumptions: (1) headquartering activity, which is
knowledge-based and knowledge-generating, can be geographically divided from production activity
and it is provided to foreign affiliates at sufficiently low cost; (2) the headquartering activity is more
skilled-labor-intensive than production activity; (3) multiple foreign affiliates can simultaneously
exploit the headquartering services. The assumption (1) and (2) are associated with vertical FDI
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motivation, implying that MNEs in skilled-labor-abundant parent country are in charge of head-
quartering activity and production plants in unskilled-labor-abundant host country take charge of
production activity to minimize production costs. The assumption (3) motivates horizontal FDI to
seek foreign market access.
Unless parent and host countries have similarities in both market size and relative factor
endowment and trade costs are low, two major types of MNEs emerge. First, in the presence of
both increasing returns and imperfect competition, horizontal MNEs will be dominant when two
countries have similarities in both market size and relative factor endowment and trade costs are
sufficiently high. If there is a difference in market size, MNEs in relatively large country would be
unwilling to invest in costly capacity in relatively small country. If there is a difference in relative
factor endowment, MNEs in relative skilled-labor-abundant country have incentives to outsource
unskilled-labor-intensive production activities to countries with relative skilled-labor-abundance.
This difference in relative factor endowment is a main ground of the emergence of vertical MNEs,
the other major type of MNEs. In vertical FDI, low trade barriers of parent country also matter
because the substantial amount of final goods should be returned back to parent country.
Recently, the standard KC model has been extended by studies devoting special attention
to the demand-side determinants. Chapter 2 and 3 in this dissertation uncover that the similarity
of per-capita income between parent and host countries matters for horizontal FDI by introducing
non-homotheticity of aggregate demands into horizontal FDI model. The paper therefore uses this
augmented KC model to estimate main results.
4.3.2 Some Issues on an Analysis on Services FDI
A main purpose of this paper is to examine the determinants for sectoral FDI and to compare
their influences in the manufacturing and services sectors. A natural question is that basic theories
to explain aggregate FDI and/or manufacturing FDI are different from those to explain services
FDI? The answer is likely to achieve a consensus in the literature. A MNE’s decision on over-
seas expansion depends on main motivations - demand-seeking (horizontal) and efficiency-seeking
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(vertical) incentives for FDI, no matter which industry it engages in. Thus, basic theories of FDI
determinants including the KC model are appropriate for analyzing manufacturing FDI as well
as services FDI, and the bulk of determinants are likely similar for the two sectors (Dunning and
McQueen, 1982; Ramasamy and Yeung, 2010; and Nefussi and Schwellnus, 2010).
The differences in the degree of importance among the determinants, however, are expected
between manufacturing and services sectors due to idiosyncratic features of each sector. The existing
studies, such as Boddewyn et al. (1986), Ramasamy and Yeung (2010), and Kolstad and Villanger
(2008), argue that services sector has several peculiar features distinguished from manufacturing
sector. First, FDI in services accompanies different types of risks than that in manufacturing
sector. For example, some services FDI into a country, where the services are highly sensitive,
exerts unexpected influences due to differences in culture and language between parent and host
countries. Second, some services industries, such as national security, telecommunication, and
electricity industries, are much less open than the manufacturing and other services industries in
general.
Finally and importantly, some services are non-tradable, implying that a facility providing
the services should be located in the region where they are consumed. Thus, service FDI is likely
attributable to greater demand, relative to manufacturing FDI. This important feature provides
two testable hypotheses of interests: (1) is services FDI more demand-seeking than manufacturing
FDI?; (2) are trade impediments important for manufacturing FDI only due to non-tradability in
services industries? Here, a comparison of relative importance of determinants within each sector
through standardized coefficients helps identify me whether empirical evidence is consistent with
the proposed hypotheses.
Recent literature on services FDI points out that producer services play a role of intermediate
goods in manufacturing processes. I accordingly explore the issue, i.e. (3) does an increase in past
manufacturing FDI positively affect current producer service FDI?
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4.4 Empirical Model, Data, Estimation Methodology, and Empirical Results
Estimating equation, data and estimation methodology used in this paper are basically the
same as the chapter 3.
4.4.1 Empirical Model
The first empirical specification is based on the main regression equation used in Carr et al.
(2001) estimating the fundamental KC model. Then, I estimate the augmented model proposed
by the chapter 2 and 3, which shows that per-capita income variables play an important role as
demand-driven factors and therefore horizontal FDI determinants. My central estimating equations
for FDI from the Korea to host country j in year t are given by:
ROFDIhft = β0 + β1 × (ROFDIhft−1) + β2 × (Sum GDPhft) + β3 × (GDP Diff Sqhft)
+ β4 × (HC Diffhft) + β5 × (GDP Diffhft ×HC Diffhft)
+ β6 × (IBft) + β7 × (TCht) + β8 × (TCft) + β9 × (HC Diff Sqhft × TCft)
+ β10 × (Sum GDPPChft) + β11 × (GDPPC Diff Sqhft)
+ β12 × (GDPPC Diffhft ×HC Diffhft) + εhft.
(4.1)
The dependent variable, ROFDI, is defined as real FDI flows to a sector done by Korean
MNE into a host country. In each regression it can be aggregate FDI, manufacturing FDI, or service
FDI. The first explanatory variable, ROFDIjt−1, is a lagged endogenous dependent variable. It
captures that when MNEs have invested more in a country in the past year, they tend to invest
more in the country in present year, i.e. so-called self-reinforcing effect or agglomeration effect
(Noorbakhsh et al., 2001; and Wheeler and Mody, 1992) and the coefficient β1 is expected to be
positive. The second explanatory variable, Sum (of) GDP , represents the sum of Korea real GDP
and host country real GDP. The coefficient β2 is in general expected to be positive as the larger
market size attracts more horizontal FDI in the standard KC theory. On the other hand, the
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similarity in size is also an important motivation for horizontal FDI, and β3 should be negative in
principle. However, the coefficient on market size similarity can be positive as one partner, here
Korea, is not sufficiently large in size. In such cases, it is difficult to discriminate theoretically
between horizontal and vertical motivations (Chellaraj et al., 2013).
In this dissertation, HC Diff is the difference in the index of human capital between Korea
and host country. Korea is relatively human-capital-abundant compared with host countries in most
cases of my sample, and it thus has a higher value of human capital index than most host countries.
The difference becomes larger as the host country is more unskilled-labor-abundant. Thus, β4 is
expected to be positive because vertical FDI more likely occurs as the Korean MNEs have more
opportunity to reduce production costs when skill difference rises. The fifth term is the product of
GDP Diff and HC Diff . Awokuse et al. (2012) explain that this variable is included to capture
that given market size, larger difference in skilled-labor endowment would decline horizontal FDI
relative to increased vertical FDI and β5 should be negative.
The sixth variable is Host Investment Barriers, indicating perceived impediments of in-
vesting in a host country. As any investment impediments are expected to lower FDI, β6 should
be negative. The next two variables are Home Trade Costs and Host Trade Cost. Higher trade
costs in the Korea (home country) discourage vertical FDI because higher costs make importing
of the final products back to the Korea more costly. Thus, β7 is expected to be negative. On the
other hand, higher trade costs in the host country foster horizontal FDI because MNEs should
prefer foreign affiliate production to costly export. Thus, β8 is expected to be positive. The next
variable HC Diff Squared × Host Trade Costs is an interaction term between squared human
capital differences and trade costs in the host country. Given a level of skill difference, higher trade
costs in the host country expand horizontal FDI. Given a level of trade costs in the host country,
larger skill difference decline horizontal FDI relative to increased vertical FDI. Given these trade-
offs, the coefficient β9 is expected to be negative as host countrys trade costs are less important
when skill difference is large.
To obtain main results, this paper estimates an augmented model by per-capita income
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variables. Recently, with an emphasis of non-homotheticity of aggregate demand, previous chapters
in this dissertation both theoretically and empirically shows that per-capita income variables play
an important role as demand-driven factors and therefore horizontal FDI determinants.
The variable, Sum (of) GDPPC, represents the sum of Korea real per-capita GDP and host
country real per-capita GDP, implying total demand size of two countries. Thus, the coefficient β10
should be positive. The next variable, GDPPC Diff Squared, examines the Linder hypothesis
for horizontal FDI that as a similar per-capita income level between two countries implies similar
demands for goods and services, the similarity in per-capita income is positively correlated to
horizontal FDI. β11 is expected to be negative. The final term is the product of GDPPC Diff
and HC Diff . This variable is included to capture that given demand difference, larger difference
in human capital would decline horizontal FDI but increase vertical FDI. The sign of β12 thus
depends on a FDI motivation that this interaction variable captures.
Most studies to estimate the KC model include geographical distance in the regression equa-
tion. Further, I can consider controlling for variables to capture cultural distance and language
difference. In this paper, however, I exclude these time-invariant factors due to the use of the GMM
estimation approach.
4.4.2 Data
My analytical sample is a balanced panel of 57 countries over the period 1999-2010.3 Data
on the dependent variables are annual flow data for aggregate FDI, FDI in manufacturing sector,
and FDI in services sector from Korea to host countries. They are from the Export-Import Bank of
Korea. These raw data represent a nominal measure and are reported in thousands of U.S. dollars.
The data were converted to a real measure in millions of 2005 dollars using a deflator from the
3The list of 57 host countries includes 13 Asian countries (Bangladesh, China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan,
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam), 2 North American countries (Canada
and United States), 26 European countries (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom), and 16 other countries (10 Other
American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, and Peru),
2 Oceanian countries (Australia and New Zealand), 2 Middle-east Asian countries (Israel and Jordan), and 2 African
countries (Egypt and South Africa)).
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World Bank.
Data on real GDP, population, and human capital used in constructing several variables are
from Penn World Table 8.0 database. According to the definition, GDP per capita is calculated by
dividing real GDP by the number of population. Annual real GDP and population are measured in
millions of 2005 U.S. dollars and in millions of people, respectively, and thus real GDP per capita
used is measured in one 2005 U.S. dollar. As a proxy for skill endowments, this paper uses an
index of human capital indicating the amount of human capital per worker. The index is created
based on information on both the average years of schooling from Barro-Lee (2012) and the return
to education from Psacharopoulos (1994). A number of studies estimating the KC model have
used occupation data from International Labour Organization (ILO) to measure relative skilled-
labor endowments. ILO data have shortcomings in that they are available for considerably limited
countries and years.
Data on trade costs and investment barriers are taken from the Economic Freedom of the
World (EFW) database of the Fraser Institute. As a proxy for trade costs, the index of regulatory
trade barriers is employed. In the case of investment impediments, I use the index labeled as
foreign ownership/investment restrictions. As both indexes have published for every 5 year before
2000, linear interpolation is conducted to obtain data in 1999. Both indexes commonly range from
zero to 10, with 10 indicating the least trade costs and the lowest investment barriers, respectively.
To construct my measures from these two indexes, I use the formula: (10 - index)10. Thus, my
measures commonly have a zero-to-100 scale and indicate that a higher value means a larger trade
costs and a higher investment barriers.
4.4.3 Estimation Methodology
Empirical analysis of this paper has the following characteristics. First, the dependent vari-
able is dynamic in nature (Awokuse et al., 2012). In this case, its lagged variable as an explanatory
variable is in general included. Second, it is pre-determined, but it is not completely exogenous, so
that its instruments are essential to estimation. Third, I need to control for some fixed effects that
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can be present across host countries. Fourth, an estimation approach using instrument variables
is also appropriate because some of independent variables can have endogeneity problem including
reverse causality. Fifth, I should consider heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation for the error term.
Finally, the number of time series is small, but the number of analyzed host countries is large.
For the reasons with availability of panel data, the empirical analysis of this paper can use a
GMM estimator. An estimator of System GMM in general shows a good performance in terms of
bias and precision than that of Differenece GMM because the former uses additional instruments.
Therefore, many applied studies with dynamic panel settings use it (e.g. Carkovic and Levine,
2005).
A GMM approach is a method in which it basically finds estimated parameters that minimize
a weighted objective function. While one-step estimator produces the estimated parameters using
an initial weight matrix, two-step estimator implements an additional procedure where the esti-
mated results driven from the one-step process are used to minimize the weighted objective function
again. It is well known that the two-step estimator is superior in terms of asymptotical properties
to the one-step estimator (Min and Choi, 2009). Therefore, the two-step estimator of System GMM
with robust errors considered for heteroscedasticity is employed to yield main estimation results.4
4.4.4 Empirical Results
This section begins with estimation results for the pure KC model. I then turn to estimation
results for augmented model as a main result to consider more demand-driven effects, such as the
Linder effect. Therefore, a comparison of estimation results between the pure KC and augmented
models allows me to decide which specification is better for eliciting demand-driven impacts. More
importantly, I investigate whether services FDI are more demand-seeking than manufacturing FDI
and whether trade impediments are important for manufacturing FDI only. Finally, I examine the
hypothesis, also tested recently in Kolstad and Villanger (2008) and Ramasamy and Yeung (2010),
that producer services FDI is positively related to manufacturing FDI in the past as producer
4See the chapter 3 for detailed discussion on System GMM estimator.
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services play a role of intermediate goods in manufacturing processes.
4.4.4.1 Estimation Results for the Pure KC Model
Table 4.2: System GMM Regression Results for the Pure KC Model
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Aggregate FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI
L.ROFDI + 0.747∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.759∗∗∗
(0.0838) (0.0711) (0.0607)
Sum GDP + 5.50e− 05∗ 9.86e-06 1.77e-05
(3.06e-05) (1.71e-05) (1.94e-05)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 3.08e-12 2.21e-12 3.33e-12
(3.41e-12) (1.37e-12) (2.31e-12)
HC Diff - / + 165.9∗∗ 97.69∗∗ 73.15∗
(82.37) (47.37) (39.03)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + -2.69e-05 −6.26e− 05∗∗ 1.06e-05
(2.93e-05) (2.67e-05) (1.31e-05)
Host Investment Barriers - -3.001 −4.771∗ -0.623
(2.150) (2.726) (1.382)
Home Trade Costs - -2.287 -1.237 -0.303
(1.497) (1.353) (0.827)
Host Trade Costs + 2.327 6.283∗∗ -0.155
(2.325) (3.060) (1.055)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −3.389∗ −2.525∗ −1.523∗∗
(1.800) (1.351) (0.688)
Number of Observations 529 374 416
Number of Countries 57 51 55
Number of Instrument Variables 53 47 47
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.90 -1.77 -2.30
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.18 -0.73 -0.71
Hansen Statistics 49.06 41.35 39.23
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.2 provides the System GMM estimation results for the pure KC model. Columns
(1), (2), and (3) report estimates for aggregate FDI, manufacturing FDI, and services FDI as
the dependent variable, respectively. I focus on two concerns from the results. The first one of
interest is that horizontal incentives captured by Sum (of) GDP and GDP Diff Squared are
not significant for almost all columns, except Sum (of) GDP for aggregate FDI. This result can
arise either because Korean multinationals take interests in horizontal incentives from demands or
because the use of market size variables to capture aggregate demand is not sufficient. As the latter
is more plausible, I add per-capita income variables in the next regression to re-examine the effects
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of growth and similarity of aggregate demand on FDI.
The second point of interest is whether there is a difference in significance ofHost Trade Costs
variable between manufacturing and services sectors. The estimation results clearly shows that the
coefficient of Host Trade Costs is positive and significant at 5% level for manufacturing FDI while
it is positive but not significant for services FDI potentially due to less tradability in services sector.
Therefore, I confirm that services FDI is not influenced by trade impediments as some services are
not tradable, consistent with Kolstad and Villanger (2008).
4.4.4.2 Main Estimation Results from the Augmented Model
Table 4.3 provides my main results using the augmented specification. Relative to earlier
specification of the basic KC model, per-capita income variables are included to capture demand-
seeking motive better as proposed by the chapter 2 and 3.
The first observation is that there are large differences in sign and significance of estimated
coefficients for Sum (of) GDP and GDP Diff Squared between Table 4.2 and 4.3. As per-capita
income variables are added in Table 4.3, the sign of the coefficients of Sum (of) GDP shifts to
unexpected one. On the other hand, Sum (of) GDPPC and GDPPC Diff Squared show the ex-
pected impacts on FDI. This is another evidence suggesting that per-capita income variables play an
important role of demand-driven factors and horizontal FDI determinants as real demand structure
is close to non-homothetic preferences. The other important point associated with market-seeking
incentives is that Sum (of) GDPPC and GDPPC Diff Squared in Columns (2) and (3) of Table
4.3 have the expected signs, but their significance varies between the two columns. This implies
that while demand-seeking incentives are likely important for services FDI, they are relatively less
important for manufacturing FDI. This result can also be supported by the earlier observation
from raw numbers in Table 4.1, which clearly shows that the ratio of manufacturing FDI over
services FDI is much higher for most developing countries than for developed countries. Because
services FDI tends to be more demand-seeking than manufacturing FDI, the first hypothesis can
be accepted.
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Consistent with Table 4.2, Table 4.3 shows that the coefficient ofHost Trade Costs is positive
and significant at 5% level for manufacturing FDI while it is positive but not significant for services
FDI. Therefore, I confirm again that trade impediments do not matter for services FDI due to non-
tradability of some services, concurring with Kolstad and Villanger (2008). I accept the second
hypothesis.
Table 4.3: System GMM Regression Results for the Augmented Model
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Aggregate FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI
L.ROFDI + 0.585∗∗∗ 0.733∗∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.0764) (0.0613)
Sum GDP + -7.89e-06 -5.28e-06 -1.36e-05
(3.78e-05) (2.08e-05) (2.76e-05)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 1.27e− 11∗∗∗ 3.04e− 12∗ 6.60e− 12∗∗
(4.36e-12) (1.81e-12) (3.02e-12)
HC Diff - / + 203.4∗∗∗ 77.49∗ 115.4∗∗
(77.87) (39.94) (56.60)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + −1.05e− 04∗∗∗ −7.37e− 05∗∗ -8.63e-06
(3.67e-05) (2.90e-05) (1.68e-05)
Host Investment Barriers - -3.775 −5..339∗ -0.817
(2.391) (2.918) (1.240)
Home Trade Costs - −10.66∗∗∗ −3.375∗ −7.294∗∗
(3.167) (1.835) (3.009)
Host Trade Costs + 4.874∗ 6.347∗∗ 1.874
(2.756) (2.916) (1.358)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −5.524∗∗ −4.654∗∗ −1.803∗∗
(2.161) (1.938) (0.897)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00730∗∗∗ 0.00218 0.00435∗∗
(0.00219) (0.00140) (0.00183)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −1.06e− 07∗ 4.11e-08 −8.60e− 08∗
(6.11e-08) (5.24e-08) (4.94e-08)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00963∗ 0.00760∗∗ 0.00260
(0.00508) (0.00387) (0.00211)
Number of Observations 529 374 416
Number of Countries 57 51 55
Number of Instrument Variables 49 50 50
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -1.85 -1.77 -2.29
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.12 -0.71 -0.65
Hansen Statistics 48.95 42.59 43.64
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The other observation from Table 4.3 is that vertical motivations for services FDI are defi-
nitely exposed through HC Diff and Home (Korea) Trade Costs. As information and commu-
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nication technologies (ICTs) have improved the tradability of services, offshoring and outsourcing of
various services are on an increasing trend (Ramasamy and Yeung, 2010). Thus, detecting vertical
motivations for services FDI is not striking.
Standardized coefficients are shown in Table 4.4 to see how the degree of importance of FDI
determinants considered in this paper differs across aggregate, manufacturing and services FDI.5
I am interested in several points which generally support the two hypotheses examined shortly
before. First, lagged FDI is commonly most important in all regressions. One-year prior FDI most
strongly prompts current FDI. Second, Korean multinationals which engage in manufacturing sector
are likely to seek vertical incentives from human capital differences and horizontal incentives from
host country trade costs. Third, for FDI in services, on the other hand, the variables to capture
market-seeking incentives rank highly. Moreover, vertical incentives from human capital differences
for FDI in services are also detected as more advanced ICTs are available. Fourth, all variables of
trade costs in services FDI do not reveal high relative importance in the order list according to a
distinctive feature of services sector.
Table 4.4: Standardized Beta Coefficients
Aggregate FDI Manufacturing FDI Services FDI
Ranking Variable Standardized Variable Standardized Variable Standardized
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
1 (1) 0.54 (1) 0.71 (1) 0.65
2 (3) 0.35 (9) -0.26 (3) 0.35
3 (9) -0.16 (5) -0.21 (10) 0.16
4 (5) -0.16 (12) 0.20 (4) 0.12
5 (10) 0.16 (8) 0.18 (9) -0.09
6 (12) 0.14 (6) -0.17 (2) -0.08
7 (4) 0.12 (3) 0.17 (11) -0.07
8 (8) 0.08 (4) 0.08 (12) 0.06
9 (6) -0.07 (10) 0.08 (7) -0.06
10 (7) -0.05 (2) -0.03 (8) 0.05
11 (11) -0.05 (7) -0.03 (6) -0.03
12 (2) -0.02 (11) 0.03 (5) -0.02
Note: (1) Lagged FDI, (2) Sum of GDP, (3) GDP Diff Square, (4) HC Diff, (5) GDP Diff × HC Diff,
(6) Host Investment Barriers, (7) Home Trade Costs, (8) Host Trade Costs, (9) HC Diff Square × Host
Trade Costs, (10) Sum of GDPPC, (11) GDPPC Diff Square, and (12) GDPPC Diff × HC Diff
5It should be noted that I cannot directly compare the estimates between manufacturing and services FDI regres-
sions because standardized beta coefficients point out the degree of relative importance among determinants within
a regression equation.
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4.4.4.3 Analysis on Producer Service FDI
The related literature has paid special attention to the issue of whether producer services play
a role of intermediate goods in manufacturing processes. Here, producer services include finance,
business, and transport industries, according to Nord˚as (2001). This idea that past manufacturing
FDI positively affects services FDI and/or producer service FDI is testable empirically.
Table 4.5: System GMM Regression Results for Producer Services FDI
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables Expected Sign Services FDI Producer Services FDI Other Services FDI
L.ROFDI + 0.734∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗
(0.0613) (0.138) (0.0611)
L.Manufacturing ROFDI + -0.00820 0.0993∗∗∗
(0.0413) (0.0122)
Sum GDP + -1.36e-05 -1.35e-05 -7.63e-06
(2.76e-05) (1.97e-05) (1.40e-05)
GDP Diff Sq - / + 6.60e− 12∗∗ 4.24e− 12∗∗ 3.05e− 12∗
(3.02e-12) (2.04e-12) (1.74e-12)
HC Diff - / + 115.4∗∗ 94.78∗∗ 42.90
(56.60) (40.89) (37.44)
GDP Diff × HC Diff - / + -8.63e-06 -5.58e-06 1.45e-05
(1.68e-05) (1.76e-05) (1.10e-05)
Host Investment Barriers - -0.817 -1.140 -0.423
(1.240) (1.659) (0.358)
Home Trade Costs - −7.294∗∗ −5.239∗ −4.843∗∗
(3.009) (2.742) (2.325)
Host Trade Costs + 1.874 2.353∗ 0.802
(1.358) (1.354) (0.693)
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs - −1.803∗∗ -1.283 -0.944
(0.897) (1.058) (1.030)
Sum GDPPC + 0.00435∗∗ 0.00323∗∗ 0.00304∗∗
(0.00183) (0.00160) (0.00149)
GDPPC Diff Sq - −8.60e− 08∗ −7.73e− 08∗∗ −5.23e− 08∗
(4.94e-08) (3.28e-08) (2.73e-08)
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff - / + 0.00260 0.00102 0.00288∗
(0.00211) (0.00221) (0.00166)
Number of Observations 416 267 320
Number of Countries 55 40 45
Number of Instrument Variables 50 38 38
Arellano-Bond Statistics (1) -2.29 -2.34 -1.90
Arellano-Bond Statistics (2) -0.65 -0.26 0.29
Hansen Statistics 43.64 30.83 35.25
Notes: ( ) Standard Error, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.5 is accordingly made by adding lagged manufacturing FDI as another explanatory
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variable into the augmented specification. Column (2) in Table 4.5 shows that the coefficient on
past manufacturing FDI exhibits unexpected sign with no significance. This result does not confirm
a complementary relationship between manufacturing and producer service FDI, conflicting with
Kolstad and Villanger (2008) and Ramasamy and Yeung (2010). Furthermore, although I do not
report the regression results from using different lagged years for the past manufacturing FDI
variable, the positive relationship is not found. Therefore, the third hypothesis is unlikely able to
be accepted.
However, there remains cautious in making a concrete conclusion on the issue. It is widely
perceived that Korea has world-class manufacturing sector but its services sector is far behind even
many developing countries in terms of labor productivity (Park and Shin, 2012). This conventional
wisdom may provide the reason that my results do not support the general prediction. Korean
manufacturing multinationals can likely use more efficient producer services from other countries
in overseas production process. If this is true, Korean (past) manufacturing and (current) services
FDI can be uncorrelated.
4.5 Summary
This paper investigates sectoral differences in the determinants of Korean outward FDI. To
compare the influences of the determinants in the manufacturing and services sectors, I analyze the
standard knowledge-capital model and its expanded version focused on demand-seeking motiva-
tions. The use of KC approach is likely possible because manufacturing FDI and services FDI does
not quite vary in that the two fundamental incentives, horizontal and vertical incentives, primarily
affect overseas expansion of multinationals in these two sectors.
In the empirical estimations, it is demonstrated that the specification augmented by per-
capita income variables is appropriate to elicit demand-driven impacts better. As expected, services
FDI is likely more demand-seeking than manufacturing FDI, and it does not tend to be largely
affected by trade impediments, showing the differences between the two sectors. Although past
manufacturing FDI is expected to lead current producer service FDI which facilitates production
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of manufacturing goods, Korean manufacturing FDI is not complementarily related to Korean
producer service FDI.
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Appendix A
Chapter 2: Numerical Model and Its Initial Calibration
Table A.1 shows the system of inequalities each with complementary variables in detail. In
this paper, pY (Y ’s price) is a numeraire (i.e. pY = 1).
Table A.1: Inequalities each with complementary variables
Inequalities Complementary variable Number of inequalities
Pricing inequalities Activity Number
pY i ≤ cY i Yi 2
pUi ≤ cUi Ui 2
pi(1− ηnii) ≤ qic Xnii 2
pj(1− ηnij) ≤ qi(c+ t) Xnij 2
pi(1− ηmii ) ≤ qic Xmii 2
pj(1− ηmij ) ≤ qjc Xmij 2
pkFCi ≤ FCki Nki 4
Market clearing inequalities Price Number∑
i demand Yic ≤
∑
i supply Yi pY 1
demand Ui ≤ supply Ui pUi 2
demand Xjc ≤
∑
k,i supply X
k
ij pj 2
demand Nki ≤ supply Nki pkFCi 4
demand Li ≤ supply Li wLi 2
demand Si ≤ supply Si wSi 2
Income balance Income Number
expenditure consi = income consi income consi 2
demand Nki = mkrev
k
i income entrev
k
i 4
Auxiliary constraints Markup Number
ηkij = (Cournot formula)
k
ij η
k
ij 8
Notes: cUi and pUi are the production cost and the price of a unit of utility in country i, respectively.
FCki and p
k
FCi are the production cost and the price of a unit of fixed costs for a country i-based type-k
firm, respectively. Nki is the activity that produces fixed costs for a country i-based type-k firm and also
the number of those firms active in equilibrium. mkrevki is total markup revenues of a country i-based
type-k firm.
Table A.2 exhibits the figures used in the calibration of the model at the center of the
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Edgeworth box, in which the two countries are identical and multinational firms are active only. In
the matrix,1 columns display the activities of both production and consumption, and rows display
markets. COLSUM means that zero profit or product exhausition conditions hold for all activities
as each of column sums is zero, and ROWSUM means that market clearing conditions hold for all
markets as each of row sums is zero.
Table A.2: Calibration of the model at the center of the Edgeworth box
Production Consumption
YI YJ XMI XMJ NMI NMJ WI WJ CONSI CONSJ ENTM ROWSUM
CYI 100 -100 0
CYJ 100 -100 0
CXI 100 -130 30 0
CXJ 100 -130 30 0
FCM 20 20 -40 0
LI -50 50 0
SI -50 -80 -15 -5 150 0
LJ -50 50 0
SJ -50 -80 -5 -15 150 0
UTILI 230 -230 0
UTILJ 230 -230 0
MKI -10 -10 20 0
MKJ -10 -10 20 0
COLSUM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: Row sums are all zero, implying that market clearing conditions hold for all markets. Column
sums are all zero, implying that zero profit conditions hold for all activities. Positive entries are receipts
(e.g. sales revenues for firms, factor sales to firms by consumers, etc). Negative entries are payments (e.g.
factor payments to consumers, markup revenues to entrepreneurs, etc).
1Positive entries denote receipts. For instance, the value 100 in the cell of (CY I, Y I) is sales revenues for firms
producing good Y in country i, and the value 150 in the cell of (SI, CONSI) is skilled labor’s sales of consumers to
all firms. Negative entries denote payments. For example, the value -50 in the cell of (LI, Y I) is total payments to
consumers by firms producing good Y in country i for using unskilled labor, and the value -10 in the cell of (MKI,
XMI) is markup revenues to entrepreneurs of country i-based multinationals.
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Appendix B
Chapter 3: Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table B.1 and Table B.2 provide summary statistics and correlation matrix on main estima-
tion analysis, respectively.
Table B.1: Summary statistics
Variable Observations Mean Standard Error Minimum Maximum
ROFDI 588 246.80 688.83 0 5748.28
L.ROFDI 580 221.05 641.25 0 5748.28
Sum GDP 684 2011569 1939941 856614 1.46e+07
GDP Diff Sq 684 3.73e+12 1.77e+13 5.71e+07 1.48e+14
HC Diff 684 0.45 0.42 -0.39 1.47
GDP Diff × HC Diff 684 208678 949944 -6764941 3977816
Host Investment Barriers 671 27.45 14.26 0 72
Home Trade Costs 684 27.25 3.52 21 33
Host Trade Costs 670 27.06 12.55 2 56
HC Diff Sq × Host Trade Costs 670 12.62 20.02 3.77e-06 97.68
Sum GDPPC 684 43286.88 15292.06 19712.18 107233.30
GDPPC Diff Sq 684 1.29e+08 3.06e+08 4060.83 3.15e+09
GDPPC Diff × HC Diff 684 5234.09 9847.78 -21471.57 33731.74
Sum POP 684 135.20 222.05 46.03 1366.35
POP Diff Sq 684 50931.05 250849.40 0.00 1612866
POP Diff × HC Diff 684 -50.97 240.59 -1667.49 91.51
GDP Diff 684 178879 1923951 -1.22e+07 1302009
GDPPC Diff 684 3274.54 14772.92 -56131.92 15740.77
POP Diff 684 -41.28 222.03 -1269.99 47.86
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